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This dissertation consists of three essays on subjective well-being.
The first essay examines whether aggregate job satisfaction in a certain labor
market environment can have an impact on individual-level job satisfaction.
We seek an answer to this question using two different datasets from the United
Kingdom characterizing two different labor market environments: Workplace
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) at the workplace level (i.e., narrowly
defined worker groups) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) at the
local labor market level (i.e., larger worker groups defined in industry × region
cells). Implementing an original empirical strategy to identify spillover effects,
we find that one standard deviation increase in aggregate job satisfaction leads
to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction at the
workplace level and 0.15 standard deviation increase in individual-level job
satisfaction at the local labor market level. These social interactions effects
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are sizable and should not be ignored in assessing the effectiveness of the
policies designed to improve job satisfaction.
Individuals tend to self-report higher subjective well-being levels on certain
days of the weeks than they do on the remaining days, controlling for observed
variation. The second essay tests whether this empirical observation suffers
from selection bias by using the 2008 release of the British Household Panel
Survey. In other words, we examine if subjective well-being is correlated with
unobserved characteristics that lead the individuals to take the interview on
specific days of the week. We focus on two distinct well-being measures: job
satisfaction and happiness. We provide convincing evidence for both of these
measures that the interviews are not randomly distributed across the days of
the week. In other words, individuals with certain unobserved characteristics
tend to take the interviews selectively. We conclude that a considerable part
of the day-of-the-week patterns can be explained by a standard “non-random
sorting on unobservables” argument rather than “mood fluctuations”. This
means that the day-of-the-week estimates reported in the literature are likely
to be biased and should be treated cautiously.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, some scholars identify ethnicity as a cause of instabil-
ity and poor economic growth, which is due to worse public policies. Eifert,
Miguel, and Posner (2010) show that ethnic identification is more prominent
during competitive election periods in comparison to other identifying cate-
gories such as gender, religion, and class/occupation. The third essay utilizes
data from 12 Sub-Saharan African countries and over 40,000 respondents taken
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from the Afrobarometer. It asks if individual subjective well-being changes in
the run up to competitive elections. We find strong evidence that individual
subjective well-being does change. It is positively related to the proximity to
an election and this proximity effect depends on the competitiveness of the
election. We further investigate the background mechanisms behind this posi-
tive relationship i.e.: to what extent does well-being of the individual change if
the party that the individual supports wins the election, and is there a change
in well-being of the individual before and after the election? In addition, we
document that ethnic identification also has a positive impact on individual
well-being after controlling for electoral cycle variables. Policy makers should
internalize these positive externalities driven from politically-induced ethnic
identification.
JEL codes: C25, C31, D60, D62, I31, J28, O55, O15.
Keywords: Subjective well-being; social interactions; spillovers; hierarchical
model; day-of-the-week effects; self-selection; treatment effects; ethnicity; elec-
tion; WERS; BHPS; Afrobarometer.
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For such a long time, economists have ignored researching individual subjective
well-being. They left the study of happiness to other disciplines, especially
psychology. When the science of economics was founded by the classics, they
thought that happiness can be measured and used to determine whether a
particular economic policy raises or lowers the happiness of the people affected.
Thereby, Jeremy Bentham for instance assumed that utility reflects pleasures
and pains, and Isidor Edgeworth believed that happiness can be measured by a
hedonometer. The situation started to change with the normative economics
that what the outcome of the public policy ought to be. It was followed
by “New Welfare Economics”, which was a normative branch of economics.
John Hicks demonstrated that human behavior, and in particular, the demand
for commodities can be explained on the basis of relative utility. Welfare
judgements can be made by resorting to the Pareto criterion, and therefore,
no comparison of welfare levels among individuals is required. This approach
simplifies economic analysis.
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However, today there is a dramatical change in economists’ thinking. Psychol-
ogists have launched new ways of measuring utility [Kahneman, Diener, and
Schwarz (1999)]. One way makes it possible to approximate individual util-
ity in a satisfactory way by posing one question—or a combination of several
question— in representative surveys. This question enables researchers to ob-
tain indications of individuals’ evaluations of their life satisfaction/happiness.
In general, as in the literature, the terms “happiness”, “well-being”, and “life
satisfaction” are used interchangeably.
Moreover, there is a vast literature that proves that the measures of reported
subjective well-being can serve as a proxy for individual utility. From then
onwards, there has been steadily increasing research in subjective well-being
on the side of economists. Subjective well-being research adds a considerable
number of new insights to well-known theoretical proportions. However, it
is still debatable to what extent these “traditional” measures of subjective
well-being accurately capture the various notions of individual utility. On the
other hand, subjective well-being enables testing different aspects of life-events
which could not be solved with using revealed preferences.
This dissertation consists of three essays on subjective well-being. The first and
the third essay address the new possibilities offered by subjective well-being.
The first one tries to understand whether individual subjective well-being can
change with social interactions and the third one analyzes the relationship
between personal identities such as ethnicity and political competition from a
subjective well-being angle. The second chapter tests to what extend we can
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trust subjective well-being data given it’s subject to “mood fluctuations”.
More specifically, in order to analyze labor market phenomena, the first essay
makes use of job satisfaction data with an interest on social interaction by
utilizing the British Household Panel Survey Data (BHPS)1 and the Work-
place Employment Relations Survey (WERS)2. The second essay investigates
whether the day-of-the-week effect estimates reported in the empirical sub-
jective well-being literature suffer from selectivity bias in large panel dataset
(BHPS). Finally, the last essay investigates subjective well-being in the frame-
work of political and development economics. It examines the impact of com-
petitive elections and ethnic identification on subjective well-being in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
The following subsections give brief description about chapters, and outline
the thesis.
1.1 Social Interactions in Job Satisfaction
In most research, job satisfaction is documented as being positively correlated
with worker performance and productivity. But whether there are any visible
footprints of social interactions in job satisfaction or not is an unanswered
question. How do my colleagues job satisfaction levels in the workplace affect
mine? To what extent does the job satisfaction of people with whom I am
1The BHPS provides information on individual, household, and job/employer-related
characteristics from 1991 to 2008 in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
2The WERS is a national survey of British employees constructed for the purpose of
collecting information on employment relations in Britain.
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working within the same industry and region influence my job satisfaction?
What kind of group-level interactions can affect my job satisfaction level? An-
swers to these questions may be important for designing policies to increase
job satisfaction. Overall, this study examines whether aggregate job satis-
faction level in a certain labour market environment can have an impact on
individual-level job satisfaction. If the answer is yes, then policies aimed to
increase job satisfaction can increase productivity through social interactions
as well.
This study conducts the analysis at two aggregation levels using two differ-
ent datasets from the UK. First, the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations
Survey (WERS) is to test the existence of job satisfaction spillovers at the
workplace level. In the workplace-level analysis, the reference group that the
social forces are effective is the set of workers in each workplace. Second, the
2004 British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is to form industry-region cells
for the purpose of testing the existence of spillovers at the local labour mar-
ket level. The second exercise tries to capture social processes that involve
collective aspects of community and work life. The conclusion of the paper is
that there are sizable social interactions in job satisfaction that should not be
ignored in assessing policy effectiveness.
An increase in aggregate job satisfaction level leads to three times higher in-
crease in individual-level job satisfaction at the workplace than at the local
labour market. Contextual social effects also have a significant impact on in-
dividual job satisfaction level. At the workplace level, job satisfaction at the
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individual-level goes up when a larger fraction of male and older workers are
present. At the local labour market level, the findings say that individual-level
job satisfaction score goes down as the fraction of workers with greater access
to promotion opportunities goes up in each industry-region cell. There are
significant income-comparison effects at the workplace, but not at the local
labour market. In particular, individual-level job satisfaction goes down with
average earnings and the fraction of high earners that is, those who earn above
the median wage within the relevant worker population in the workplace.
These results suggest first, that there are large gains to policy interventions
to increase individual-level job satisfaction, as there are significant positive
feedback effects from group-level job satisfaction toward individual-level job
satisfaction in the form of spillover externalities. Second, failing to account
for the spillover externalities in job satisfaction may lead to an incorrect as-
sessment of the effectiveness of job satisfaction policies. Thus, policy-makers
should internalise these externalities. Third, job satisfaction spillovers are
much stronger at the workplace level than local labour market level: therefore,
designing and enforcing job satisfaction policies at the workplace level will
likely be more effective than implementing such policies at the local labour
market level.
1.2 Selection Correction on Day-Of-The-Week
Empirical studies document that individuals tend to report lower levels of
happiness on Sundays and/or Mondays, whereas they tend to report higher job
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satisfaction levels on Fridays and/or Saturdays than the other days of the week,
controlling for observed variation [Taylor (2006), Akay and Martinsson (2009),
and Helliwell and Wang (2013)]. These results are based on the main micro-
level datasets such as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the German
Socio-Economic Panel Survey (GSOEP), and the Gallup/Healthways polls as
well as several small-scale surveys. This literature suggests that subjective
well-being varies significantly across the days of the week.
Are people’s mood really sensitive to the day-of-the-week or do people actually
select the day-of-the-week that they take the survey depend on their daily
routine and/or their unobserved characteristics? As an example, self reported
job satisfaction is the highest on Fridays and Saturdays, it may be the case
that hard-working individuals —already highly satisfied jobwise— have only
time left to fill the survey on days like Friday or Saturdays since they are
occupied with work during the week. Alternatively, individuals, who are not
working hard throughout the week can prefer to take the survey on Sundays
instead of resting or Monday, which can be a good reason for procrastination
due to the overload go beginning of new week. These types of individuals can
be already unsatisfied with their jobs or lives in general. Overall, if selectivity
is in action, then this would weaken the argument of “mood” fluctuations over
the days of the week.
To summarize, the main hypothesis we test in this essay is: the day-of-the-
week estimates reported in the empirical literature may be contaminated with
selection bias. Whether this hypothesis is rejected or not will be important
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for economic modeling. If the selection bias is significant and, as a result,
the day-of-the-week effects disappear after selection correction, then this will
cast doubt on the relevance of the “mood fluctuations” argument. Thus, the
shadow hypothesis we test is the relevance of the “neoclassical stable prefer-
ences assumption” against preferences subject to “mood fluctuations”.
This study finds significant positive selection both for job satisfaction and hap-
piness, utilizing the 2008 release of British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
For job satisfaction, the ones who are interviewed on Fridays or Saturdays tend
to report higher job satisfaction and for happiness, those who are interviewed
on Sundays or Mondays tend to report lower happiness levels than a random
sample drawn from the population of employed workers with a comparable set
of observed characteristic would report. The conclusion of the paper is that
the magnitude of the selection bias originating from these compositional shifts
is so large that there is only little room for the “mood fluctuations” argument.
After selection correction, the estimated treatment effects for job satisfaction
are higher among males, non-married workers, workers with permanent jobs,
public sector workers, workers in large firms, union members, workers with
good health, workers who prefer to work less, workers with higher relative in-
come, workers with higher education, and middle-aged workers. The patterns
are similar for happiness as well.
These findings provide evidence that the existence of weekly cycles in individ-
ual subjective well-being may not be as relevant as the literature documents.
There is a considerable individual-level unobserved heterogeneity determin-
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ing well-being scores, and the compositional changes in interviewees in terms
of these heterogeneous factors drive most of the observed differences is self-
reported subjective well-being across the days of the week.
We do not totally rule out the state-dependent nature of utility. Utility may
be changing across states if these states reflect some fundamental feature of
individual utility; such as employment status, marital status, etc. We rather
argue that day-to-day shifts in agents’ valuation of economic objects do not
have strong empirical basis, when selectivity is controlled for.
1.3 Competitive Elections and Ethnic Identi-
fication
Ethnic identity in Africa is formed the individual’s life settings. The relevance
of ethnic identification is controversial; some scholars argue that the source
is culture, and for others is politics. Recently Eifert, Miguel, and Posner
(2010) stated, the source of ethnic salience comes from political competition:
in other words, proximity to competitive elections increases the strength of
ethnic attachments.
In ethnically diverse countries, political parties have used ethnic identity to
mobilize voters and to establish political alliances, leading in some cases to
violent ethnic conflicts. In competitive elections this can result in the loss
of lives and massive destruction of property. Easterly and Levine (1997)’s
famous “growth tragedy” is primarily based on the strong link between ethnic
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heterogeneity and slow growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Some scholars
point out ethnicity as a cause of instability and poor economic growth, which
is due to worse public policies.
This study poses the following questions “How does the competitive election
affect happiness of the people?”, “Does a competitive election make them hap-
pier than a landslide election?”, “If a competitive election makes the people
happier, what is the underlying mechanism?, and “How happy are the peo-
ple if they identify themselves ethnically?” Answering these questions may be
important for policies as opposed to politically-induced ethnic identification.
Overall, the first aim of the study is to determine how competitive elections
affect the individual subjective well-being when they are proximate. As the
second aim, since competitive elections increase the salience of ethnic identi-
fication, this study investigates the relationship between ethnic identification
and subjective well-being after controlling for electoral cycle variables.
We conduct the analysis with several well-being questions, which the Afro-
barometer includes, across 12 African countries over 40,000 respondents. The
results show that for every month closer a country is to a competitive election,
on average individual-level subjective well-being has a 0.015 standard devi-
ation increase. There are several possible mechanisms that account for this
positive relationship. The more prominent ones are winning the election; sub-
jective well-being of the individual gets positively stronger if the party that the
individual support wins the competitive election, and the asymmetrical effects
of the election; the proximity —before and after the election— is positively
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related to subjective well-being, but the impact before the election is greater
than that after the election. The result of the second aim is that if individuals
identify themselves ethnically, this is positively correlated with individual-level
subjective well-being after controlling for electoral cycle variables.
These findings suggest that positive externalities exists from competitive elec-
tions and ethnic identification to the individual subjective well-being. These
results should be taken into consideration when implementing policies opposed
to politically induced ethnic identification. Ethnicity can help to develop so-
ciety, both socially and economically, by mobilizing people to initiate develop-
ment projects in their communities. However, one should be cautious about
that these findings are only affected in short-term, the effects of long-term are
unknown.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 examines whether there is any visible footprints of social interaction
in job satisfaction by utilizing two different dataset and social environment.
Chapter 3 first replicates the literature findings about relationship between
subjective well-being and days-of-the-week and then asks if these day-of-the-
week estimates for job satisfaction and happiness measures suffer from selection
bias in large panel dataset. Chapter 4 investigates how competitive elections
affect individual subjective well-being when they are proximate and how the
ethnic identification is related to subjective well-being.
The first two chapters are co-authored with Semih Tumen. The companion
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work of Chapter 2 [Tumen and Zeydanli (2014)] is forthcoming at Journal of
Happiness Studies. Chapter 3 is forthcoming at Social Indicators Research.
The ideas contained in this thesis aim at contributing subjective well-being
literature and shall not be associated with views of any of the aforementioned
institutions nor their policies. Any errors are mine.
Each chapter is a self-contained manuscript. For the reader’s convenience, the
common bibliography is collected at the end of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL INTERACTION IN JOB
SATISFACTION
Job satisfaction is a direct measure of utility an employed worker derives from
his/her current job [Clark and Oswald (1996)]. It has extensive behavioral
consequences. For example, job satisfaction is a significant determinant of la-
bor market mobility—in particular, the quitting behavior.1 It is also shown
to be related to relative pay comparisons among peer groups in the work-
place.2 Most importantly, and this is mainly why labor economists should be
interested in job satisfaction, it is documented to have a positive correlation
with labor productivity and worker performance.3 In particular, Boeckerman
and Ilmakunnas (2012) document that job satisfaction has a causal effect on
productivity.4 To get the feel of the magnitude, Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas
1See, e.g., Freeman (1978), Akerlof et al. (1988), Clark et al. (1998), and Clark (2001).
2See, for example, Clark et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2012).
3Other studies documenting this positive relationship include, but are not limited to,
Iaffaldano and Muchinsky (1985), Ostroff (1992), Brown and Peterson (1994), Ryan et al.
(1996), Sloane and Williams (2000), Argyle (2001), Judge et al. (2001), Harter et al. (2002),
Schneider et al. (2003), Patterson et al. (2004), Green and Tsitsianis (2005), Otis and
Pelletier (2005), Christen et al. (2006), Ghinetti (2007), and Wegge et al. (2007). Zelenski
et al. (2008) and Oswald et al. (2014) argue that happiness and life satisfaction are also
positively correlated with productivity.
4The direction of the causal relationship between productivity and job satisfaction has
been controversial in the literature. However, recent evidence suggests that the direction of
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(2012) find that one standard deviation increase in job satisfaction within the
plant increases productivity per hours worked by 6.6 percent.
Although several aspects of job satisfaction have been studied extensively in
the empirical literature, whether there exist spillover externalities in job satis-
faction—i.e., whether individual-level job satisfaction is affected by the aggre-
gate job satisfaction in a certain labor market environment—or not remains
as an unanswered question. This is a relevant question because job satisfac-
tion is often associated with workplace attitudes such as involvement in the
organization, relatedness with co-workers/customers/managers, attachment,
motivation, shirking, tendency to slow down work, absenteeism, etc. These
attitudes form a workplace “atmosphere” and jointly contribute to the for-
mation of worker satisfaction and performance. Therefore, the aggregate job
satisfaction level in a certain work environment can be regarded as a “social”
variable and may, in turn, affect individual-level job satisfaction.
Our ultimate goal in this paper is to investigate if there exist any visible foot-
prints of social interactions in job satisfaction. Answering this question is
also important for policy. If there exist positive spillovers in job satisfaction,
then policies targeted to increase job satisfaction can boost productivity not
only directly, but through spillover externalities too. When these social inter-
actions effects are sizable, ignoring them may lead to mis-assessment of the
effectiveness of the policies designed to improve job satisfaction in various work
environments.
the relationship goes from job satisfaction to labor productivity.
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We perform our empirical analysis at two aggregation levels using two different
data sets from the United Kingdom. First, we use the Workplace Employment
Relations Survey (WERS) to test the existence of job satisfaction spillovers at
the workplace level (or establishment-level).5 In the workplace-level analysis,
the reference group that the social forces are effective is the set of workers in
each workplace. Second, we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to
form industry× region cells for the purpose of testing the existence of spillovers
at the local labor market level. In this second exercise, we try to capture more
general social effects in larger reference groups. The main purpose is to focus on
social processes that involve collective aspects of community and work life. In
both of these exercises, we concentrate on estimating the correlation between
the group-level and individual-level job satisfaction scores, controlling for a
large set of observed covariates. Drawing a distinction between the workplace
and local labor market level analyses is useful, because it will allow us to make
precise statements on whether it is more effective to enforce job satisfaction
policies at the establishment level (i.e., as firm-specific policies) or local labor
market level (i.e., in the form of broader institutional measures).
Our econometric framework will be a version of the canonical linear-in-means
model, which is a base for the bulk of empirical work on social interactions.6
The main problem with the linear-in-means model is that it necessitates em-
ploying a carefully-designed identification strategy to separate endogenous ef-
5The terms “workplace” and “establishment” will be used interchangeably throughout
the paper.
6See Blume et al. (2011) for an in-depth background information on linear-in-means
models, including a comprehensive discussion on micro-foundations and econometric iden-
tification. Also see Blume and Durlauf (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001b), and Soetevent
(2006).
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fects from the contextual effects [Manski (1993)]. It will perhaps be useful at
this point to clearly define the terms “endogenous social effects” and “contex-
tual social effects.”7 The endogenous effect refers to the effect of the group-
level outcome on the individual-level outcome. Within the context of our
paper, this corresponds to the effect of the group-level mean of job satisfaction
on the individual-level job satisfaction. The contextual effect, on the other
hand, refers to the effect of the group-level counterparts of the individual-level
observables on the individual-level outcome variable; in our paper, this corre-
sponds to the effect of, say, group-level average age or average education on
the individual-level job satisfaction score.
At the center of our identification strategy lies an insight from the hierarchi-
cal (or multilevel) statistical models of social processes: social groups describe
“ecologies” in which decisions are made and matter because different ecologies
induce different mappings from the individual determinants of these decisions
to the associated outcomes [Raudenbush and Sampson (1999)]. Based on this
conceptualization, we construct an empirical model in which contextual effects
(i.e., the “ecologies” in our model) alter the coefficients linking individual char-
acteristics to outcomes. This corresponds to allowing for multiplicative inter-
actions between the contextual effects and the remaining explanatory terms
within the linear-in-means model. We formally show that introducing these
cross-product terms induces non-linearities that resolve the reflection problem
Manski (1993) describes [see Section 2.3]. Such a setup secures the economet-
ric identification of social interactions and enables us to separate endogenous
7See also Manski (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b) for a more detailed discussion
of the different types of social interactions effects.
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effects from the contextual effects [Blume and Durlauf (2005)]. Although, this
approach is rather simple and intuitive, it is surprisingly under-utilized in the
literature.
There are two more potential threats to identification. The first one is the
possibility of sorting into reference groups based on unobserved factors [Man-
ski (1993)]. The sorting can be conducted two ways; one is via group-level
unobserved factors and the other is via sorting into reference groups. These
two can also be potentially related to each other. If group-level unobserved
factors that determine individual-level job satisfaction exist and are also cor-
related with group-level job satisfaction, then the resulting estimates would
be biased. Our empirical approach also allows us to address this problem, at
least partially, by controlling for group-level unobservables in various ways.
Endogenous sorting would occur in several dimensions. It may be the case
that group-level unobserved factors trigger the selection but do not determine
the individual-level satisfaction. This relationship can also work inversely, i.e.,
group-level unobserved factors may be more recent than the sorting. However,
there are several limitations in solving endogenous group selection that we will
discuss later. And, second, it is well-documented in the literature that the rel-
ative income structure within the reference group is an important determinant
of the job satisfaction level in the peer group [Card et al. (2012)]. We also
control for the pay-comparison effects in our calculations.
We find that one standard deviation increase in aggregate job satisfaction
level leads to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satis-
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faction score at the workplace level and a 0.15 standard deviation increase in
individual-level job satisfaction score at the local labor market level. In other
words, we report that statistically significant job satisfaction spillovers exist
both at the establishment level and local labor market level; and, the estimated
spillovers are approximately three times larger at the establishment level than
those at the local labor market level. These estimates can be restated in terms
of the social multiplier: the corresponding social multipliers are [1/(1 - 0.42)≈]
1.72 and [1/(1 - 0.15)≈] 1.18 at the workplace and local labor market levels,
respectively.8 Simple calculations yield the result that the Boeckerman and
Ilmakunnas (2012) estimates—which say that one standard deviation increase
in job satisfaction within the plant increases productivity per hours worked by
6.6 percent—would be revised up to 11.4 percent at the workplace level and 7.8
percent at the local labor market level after accounting for the job satisfaction
spillovers. To summarize, these results suggest that (1) failing to account for
the spillover externalities in job satisfaction may lead us to mis-assess the effec-
tiveness of job satisfaction policies; thus, the policy maker should internalize
these externalities, and (2) job satisfaction spillovers are much stronger at the
workplace level than local labor market level; therefore, designing/enforcing
job satisfaction policies at the workplace level will likely be more effective than
implementing such policies at the local labor market level.
We also report estimates for contextual social effects. At the workplace level,
we find that individual-level job satisfaction goes up with the fraction of male
and older workers in the workplace. At the local labor market level, however,
8See Glaeser et al. (2003) for an excellent discussion of the social multiplier concept.
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gender and age do not have any statistically significant contextual effect; in-
stead, we only find that individual-level job satisfaction score goes down as the
fraction of workers with greater access to promotion opportunities goes up in
each industry × region cell. We also document that there are significant “in-
come comparison effects” at the workplace, but not at the local labor market.
In particular, we find that individual-level job satisfaction goes down with (i)
average earnings and (ii) fraction of high earners—i.e., those who earn above
the median wage within the relevant worker population—in the workplace.
We discuss these results further in Section 2.5, where we also present detailed
robustness exercises to prove that our estimates are not excessively sensitive
to relaxing some of the main assumptions behind the empirical model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 relates and compares our work
to the relevant papers in the literature. Section 2.2 explains the details of
the econometric model and the identification strategy we employ. Section 2.3
provides an overview of the data sets we use and justifies the construction of our
reference groups in different work settings. Section 2.4 presents the estimates,
discusses in detail the results, performs robustness checks, and elaborates on
the policy implications. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 Related Literature
Our paper can be placed into the literature investigating social interactions
in labor markets. There is a large body of literature testing the existence of
peer effects in various labor market outcomes including productivity, wages,
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absenteeism, and learning (or knowledge spillovers). The results are mixed.
For example, using grocery scanner data from a large supermarket chain, Mas
and Moretti (2009) perform a field experiment among low-wage earners to
analyze if the individual-level effort is influenced by a permanent increase in
the productivity of co-workers and find reasonably large peer effects. Falk and
Ichino (2006) study the behavior of high school students performing a simple
task in a laboratory experiment to understand if individual-level performances
are directly affected by the existence of other individuals doing the same task
and they also document moderate peer effects. Ichino and Maggi (2000) find
that group-level peer absenteeism increases individual absenteeism. In a field
study, Bandiera et al. (2009) find that individual-level productivity responds
to the skill-level of a friend working nearby, but does not respond to the skill-
level of a non-friend working around. Guryan et al. (2009), on the other
hand, find employing a random assignment exercise on a golf tournament data
that individual-level performance is not influenced by the playing partners’
ability. Cornelissen et al. (2013) report only small peer effects in wages among
co-workers.9 While Azoulay et al. (2010) and Jackson and Bruegmann (2009)
document significant knowledge spillovers among co-workers, Waldinger (2012)
shows that those spillovers are weak, if they ever exist.
There are also several papers investigating contagion effects in subjective well-
being measures. Using Chinese rural survey data, Knight and Gunatilaka
(2009) examine whether happiness is infectious or not at the village level.
Their results show that happiness is infectious in narrowly-defined reference
9Here, “peer effects in wages” refer to the idea that peer-induced productivity increases
could be rewarded in the form of higher wages.
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groups. They exploit the panel feature of their data set to remove the reflection
problem and identify the relevant social effects. Papers in the psychology
literature also find that happiness might be contagious in small environments.10
However, these studies do not address the reflection problem, which might bias
the results. Tumen and Zeydanli (2014), on the other hand, find that these
contagion effects might disappear in more broadly defined reference groups.
Our paper differs from this body of work and contributes to the related lit-
erature in three ways. First, this is the first paper in the literature estimat-
ing spillover effects in job satisfaction. We show that there exist statistically
and economically significant job satisfaction spillovers in various work environ-
ments. Second, we show that the degree of these spillover externalities may
change at different aggregation levels. Using two different data sets from the
United Kingdom, we construct our reference groups at two aggregation levels:
workplace level and local labor market level. The former defines peer effects in
narrowly defined work settings, while the latter defines the social environment
in larger ecological settings that embed more general aspects of community
and working life. We document that the job satisfaction spillovers exist in
both environments; but, they are much stronger at the workplace level than
local labor market level. We further argue that this may have important pol-
icy implications. And, third, motivated by the hierarchical models of social
processes, we develop an original identification strategy to separate endoge-
nous effects from the contextual effects, controlling for group-level unobserved
heterogeneity.
10See, e.g., Hatfield et al. (1994), Sato and Yoshikawa (2007), and Fowler and Christakis
(2008).
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There are also several papers criticizing the empirical literature on peer ef-
fects.11 In particular, Angrist (2014) has pointed out that many papers in
the literature falsely interpret the observed correlations between individual-
and group-level outcomes as causal relationships. He argues that the instru-
mental variable (IV) estimates reported in this literature “often ... produce
findings that look like a peer effect, even in a world where behavioral influences
between peers are absent.” In this paper, we do not use the IV approach; in-
stead, we rely on a non-linear model of social interactions—which is motivated
by hierarchical statistical models—to obtain econometric identification. The
non-linear models are not free of problems, either. The most common criticism
is that, most of the time, the non-linear structure used to identify peer effects
is hard to justify. The non-linear specification that we use in this paper has
two appealing features. First, the non-linearity is simply obtained by including
certain interaction terms between the regressors of a standard linear-in-means
model. The use of interaction terms is quite common in regression analysis and
are never regarded as strange or unjustified. Second, the inclusion of interac-
tion terms into linear-in-means models is theoretically justified by the “social
ecologies” viewpoint in a strand of the sociology literature.12 See Raudenbush
and Sampson (1999) and Blume and Durlauf (2005) for further motivation
and references. Next, we present the details of our non-linear model of social
interactions and describe our identification strategy.
11See, e.g., Moffitt (2001), and Angrist (2014).
12The origins of the term “social ecologies” or “ecological settings” goes back to the
Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s [see, e.g., Cavan (1983)].
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2.2 Model and Theoretical Background
The econometric framework that we employ in this paper is a version of the
canonical linear-in-means model of social interactions. Our ultimate goal is
to estimate social interactions in job satisfaction. In particular, we would like
to estimate the effects of (1) group-level job satisfaction—the “endogenous
social effect”—and (2) group-level exogenous characteristics—the “contextual
effects”—on individual-level job satisfaction, controlling for group-level hetero-
geneity. The linear-in-means model of social interactions is plagued with the
well-known “reflection problem,” which masks the econometric identification
of social interactions [Manski (1993)]. The simplest way to resolve this issue is
to use an appropriately formulated instrumental variables strategy. When an
instrument is not available, it is necessary to invoke non-linearities to identify
social interactions [Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Blume et al. (2011)].
In this paper, we use an empirical strategy that allows us to convert the stan-
dard linear model into a nonlinear one. The motivation comes from the hier-
archical models of social processes. This hierarchical structure secures iden-
tification of social interactions via introducing cross-product terms into the
standard model. This section provides a detailed description of our economet-
ric model for the purpose of familiarizing the reader with the basic concepts
we frequently mention throughout the paper. Section 2.2.1 presents our em-
pirical model and the associated technical issues (i.e., the reflection problem)
including a formal statement of the conditions required to identify social inter-
actions. Section 2.2.2 describes our hierarchical model and assesses in detail
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how we achieve identification.
2.2.1 The Empirical Model of Social Interactions
Each individual i ∈ I is a member of a group g ∈ G, where I is the number
of individuals in the worker population and G is the number of groups, with
I > G. The following linear-in-means equation is an empirical tool commonly
used in the literature:
ωig = β0 + β1Xig + β2Yg + Jmg + ug + εig , (2.1)
where the dependent variable, ωig , is the individual-level job satisfaction for
person i in group g, Xig is a vector of individual-level observed characteristics
of i in group g, Yg is a vector of group-level observed characteristics of group
g, mg = E[ωig |g, Fig ] is the mean job satisfaction in group g, ug is a group-level
unobserved factor common across the members of group g, and εig is a random
error term with E[εig |g, Fig ] = 0. In our notation, Fig corresponds to the
empirical distribution of individuals in group g and this distribution is possibly
different for each group. The distinction between β2 (contextual effects) and
J (endogenous effect) is the key notion in this model. The former measures
the effect of exogenous group-level variables on the individual-level outcome,
while the latter measures the effect of endogenous group-level outcome on
the individual-level outcome. Our ultimate goal is to clearly distinguish β2
from J and to separately identify the effects of group-level variables on the
individual-level outcome. However, econometric identification is a problematic
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issue in this standard setting. In what follows, we shut down the group-level
unobserved effect ug for notational simplicity. It will reappear in our final
equation.
To define the identification problem, we take the conditional mathematical
expectations of both sides of the linear-in-means equation, where the condi-
tioning is on g and Fig , for all i and g. This gives us
mg = β0 + β1Xg + β2Yg + Jmg, (2.2)
where Xg = E[Xig |g, Fig ]. Xg can be named as the group-level mean of
individual-level observed characteristics and it may or may not coincide with
Yg. Notice that mg appears in both sides of Equation (2.2). Solving for mg











The reflection problem states that if the dimensions of the vectors Xg and
Yg are the same, then linearity masks the econometric identification of the
(endogenous) social interactions parameter J .
To formalize this statement, we plug Equation (2.3) into Equation (2.1), which










Yg + εig . (2.4)
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When the reflection problem is in effect, J and β2 cannot be distinguished
from each other, which implies that social interactions cannot be identified.







Yg + εig . (2.5)
It is obvious that, in this equation, it is impossible to separate J from β2
econometrically. One solution is the existence of an additional Xg which is not
in Yg. If such an Xg exists, then endogenous social interactions (J)—and also
all the other model parameters—are identified by applying simple ordinary
least-squares method on Equation (2.4). In other words, one individual-level
variable, the mean of which cannot be regarded as a group-level variable, is
required for identification of social interactions.
Unfortunately, most of the large data sets—such as BHPS, GSOEP, WERS,
etc.—do not include a variable Xg that can naturally fit into the IV definition
provided above. One popular alternative to IV is to introduce non-linearities
into the linear-in-means specification. To demonstrate how non-linearities se-
cure identification, we modify the standard model as follows:
ωig = β0 + β1Xig + β2Yg + Jφ(mg) + εig , (2.6)
where φ(·) has non-zero second derivatives; that is, it is a legitimate nonlinear
function. Without loss of generality, we assume also that φ(·) is invertible.
Again, taking the conditional mathematical expectations of both sides and
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rearranging the terms in such a way that the terms with mg appears on the
left and the rest of the variables on the right, we get the equation
Φ(mg) = β0 + β1Xg + β2Yg, (2.7)
where Φ(mg) = mg − Jφ(mg). The functions φ(·) and Φ(·) has the same
properties, therefore we can invert Φ(·) to get
mg = Φ
−1 (β0 + β1Xg + β2Yg) (2.8)
and plugging this into the original estimating equation we get
ωig = β0 + β1Xig + β2Yg + Jφ
[
Φ−1 (β0 + β1Xg + β2Yg)
]
+ εig . (2.9)
In such a setting, we can identify β2 and J separately without a further need
for an exclusion restriction (or an IV). One problem with this framework is
that there is no systematic way of choosing the functional form of φ(·). In this
paper, we propose an estimation strategy that introduces a systematic way to
embed non-linearities into the standard empirical specification. To be specific,
we construct a hierarchical model, which has the additional advantage of being
consistent with our definition and conceptualization of social interactions in
job satisfaction.
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2.2.2 The Hierarchical Model
Suppose that the Equation (2.1) is modified as follows:
ωig = α0 (Yg) + α1 (Yg)Xig + αJ (Yg)mg + ug + εig . (2.10)
In words, the coefficients α0, α1, and αJ are stated as functions of the con-
textual variables, Yg, which define the “social context.” In other words, the
contextual variables describe the properties of the environments that the in-
dividuals live in. Setting up the regression coefficients in this way implies
that social groups describe ecologies in which decisions are made and matter
because different ecologies induce different mappings from the individual de-
terminants of these behaviors and choices.13 To convert this setting into an
empirical equation that we can estimate, we make the following simplifying
assumptions:
α0 (Yg) = β0 + β2Yg,
α1 (Yg) = β1 + bYg,
αJ (Yg) = J + πYg.
13As an example, suppose that we have two contextual variables in a workplace environ-
ment: age and gender. In such a case, whether the environment is dominated by young
versus old workers or female versus male workers or not really matters. In other words, the
determinants of job satisfaction will depend on the “atmosphere” formed by these team or
group attitudes.
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Plugging these expressions into Equation (2.10) yields
ωig = β0 + β1Xig + β2Yg + Jmg + πYgmg + Y
′
gBXig + ug + εig , (2.11)
where B is the matrix form of the coefficient vector b. This equation looks
very similar to our original linear-in-means specification except that we include
interaction terms in the form of cross products motivated by the hierarchical
model.
Note that the nature of the unobserved group-level effect ug is a crucial issue.
There are two alternatives: random effects versus fixed effects. If the true
unobserved group-level effect can be controlled for up to a random error term,
then a common way to resolve this issue is to assume that ug is itself random
rather than fixed. Assuming that ug is random is equivalent to saying that it
is uncorrelated with the regressors. However, group-level unobserved factors
can easily be argued to be correlated with, say, group-level job satisfaction.
When this is the case, not being able to control group fixed effects will yield
erroneous results. In our baseline analysis, we assume that ug is a random
term. We then relax this assumption and control for group-level fixed effects
to check if the results differ [see Section 2.4]. We also cluster standard errors
at the group level, which means that we account for within-group correlations
in the error structure.
To demonstrate how this model is identified, we take the conditional mathe-
matical expectations of both sides, as before, and solve the resulting equation
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for mg, which gives us
mg =
β0 + β1Xg + β2Yg + Y
′
gBXg
1− J − πYg
. (2.12)
Notice that, very similar to the motivation behind the nonlinear model, this
model also introduces non-linearity between mg and the other regressors, even
when Xg = Yg. There is no need for an exclusion restriction and econometric
identification of social influences is immediate, given standard conditions on
individual- and group-level observed covariates [see Blume and Durlauf (2005)
for further details]. This formulation is consistent with our hypothesis and our
definition of social interactions.
At the end, we estimate Equation (2.11) to separately identify β2 and J . In
this setup, the endogenous social effect is J + πȲg, where Ȳg are the sample
means of group-level variables, i.e., the endogenous effect is no more J since
we have cross-product terms in the regressions. The same logic applies to the
contextual effects we estimate. The estimates we report and discuss in Section
2.4 directly refer to these “marginal effects.”
2.3 Data and Reference Groups
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the two data sets we use in
our empirical analysis: Workplace Employment Relations Survey and British
Household Panel Survey. Both of these surveys are nationally representa-
tive data sets for the United Kingdom and provide establishment-level and
individual-level labor market information, respectively. We also describe in
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detail the construction of our reference groups for both of these data sets. We
focus on the 2004 editions of both data sets.
2.3.1 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS)
WERS is a national survey of British employees constructed for the purpose
of collecting information on employment relations in Britain.14 The survey
provides information about workers, working conditions, and industrial rela-
tions from all sectors except primary industries and private households with
domestic staff. WERS 2004—the version that we use in our analysis—is the
fifth among a series of surveys. Previous surveys are conducted in 1980, 1984,
1990, and 1998. In the 2004 cross-section, there are around 2,300 workplaces,
1,000 employee representatives, and 22,500 employees.
We construct the job satisfaction scores using the following seven question in
the WERS-2004 data set. How satisfied are you with
1) the sense of achievement you get from work?
2) the scope for using your own initiative?
3) the amount of influence you have over the job?
4) the training you receive?
5) the amount of pay you receive?
6) the job security?
7) the work itself?
14The most recent version of this data set has been co-sponsored by the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Acas, the Economic and Social Research Coun-
cil (ESRC), the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), and the National
Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).
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The responses are based on a five-point scale with 1 representing “very satis-
fied,” 2 “satisfied,” 3 “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” 4 “dissatisfied,” and 5
“very dissatisfied.” For each of the seven questions listed above, we construct
a binary variable for the positive responses—taking the value 1 for the “very
satisfied” or “satisfied” responses and 0 otherwise—and, then, we construct a
sum of the seven binary variables for each individual to form an index with
values from 0 to 7 [see also Jones et al. (2009), Jones and Sloane (2010), and
Mumford and Smith (2013)].15 We use this aggregate measure as the “job
satisfaction score” in our analysis. The average job satisfaction score in our
sample is 4.20 and the standard deviation is 2.13. The BHPS data set, which
we describe in the following subsection, has a 1–7 scale constructed based on
different principles. For the sake of comparability of the estimates, we stan-
dardize the main job satisfaction measures in both WERS and BHPS around
zero mean and unit variance. Thus, the dependent variable in our analysis will
be the “standardized job satisfaction.”
We control for a large set of individual- and job-related characteristics. To
achieve consistency between the two data sets, we construct the WERS vari-
ables similar to their counterparts in the BHPS data set. After excluding miss-
ing information on our control variables and dropping workplaces with less than
two employees, the WERS data set includes 1,673 workplaces/establishments
and, in each workplace, up to 25 randomly-chosen employees taking the ques-
15Although Mumford and Smith (2013) use the six facets of job satisfaction in the WERS,
neglecting the training, Jones and Sloane (2010) use all of them. Jones et al. (2009) argue
that training is also an important component for job satisfaction. We also include training.
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tionnaire.16 We start with describing the education variables. Since this is
a workplace-level data set, “No Qualification” category includes only a very
small number of observations; thus, we drop the observations in this category
and concentrate on the following education levels: “Higher Degree” (refers
to postgraduate education), “First Degree” (refers to college education), “A-
level,” “O-level” (both referring to different classes of high-school education),
and “Vocational Qualification.”17 Earnings variable in the WERS is reported
in 14 pre-specified intervals,18 and, following Mumford and Smith (2009), we
use the midpoints of these intervals as our earnings variable for each individual.
The last interval is open ended, so it does not have a midpoint; instead, we use
the mean earnings for the last interval. In our sample, the average weekly log
earnings is around 5.7. We also include relative earnings as a dummy variable
taking 1 if the employee earns more than the mean earnings in the sample.
We categorize the job status under three sector categories: private sector job,
public sector job, and other. An establishment size variable is generated from
the question of “Currently, how many employees do you have on the payroll at
this establishment?” The answer varies from 5 to 10,000. We construct three
variables for establishment size; small establishment (less than 50 employees),
medium-size establishment (between 50 and 200 employees), and large estab-
lishment (more than 200 employees). Working hours are simply represented
16For consistency, the individuals in the BHPS data set who work in firms with less than
two employees are correspondingly dropped.
17To be concrete, after constructing our sample, we observed that only two individuals
remained in the data with no school degrees. We think that dropping these two observations
would be more reasonable than generating a new education category called “no degree.” Such
a category, on the other hand, exists in our BHPS sample since the number of individuals
with no degree is non-negligible in the BHPS data.
18The question of the earnings variable is the following: “How much do you get paid for
your job here, before tax and other deductions?”
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as a dummy variable taking 1 if the actual hours worked is above the sample
mean and 0 otherwise.
Among 20,035 employees and 1,673 establishments in our sample, the average
age is 42, 47 percent are male, and 68 percent are married. Higher degree
has the lowest fraction, whereas vocational qualifications have the highest. 46
percent of the employees are union members. 55 percent of the workplaces
are publicly owned. Regarding the establishment size, the shares of small,
medium, and large establishments are 0.32, 0.32, and 0.36, respectively. See
Table (2.1) for detailed summary statistics for our WERS sample.
2.3.2 British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
The BHPS provides information on individual-, household-, and job/employer-
related characteristics from 1991 to 2008 in England, Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland. It yearly follows the same representative sample of house-
holds interviewing every adult member of sampled households. Eighteen waves
of data are available. To make the two data sets comparable and compatible,
we focus on the 2004 cross-section of the BHPS.
The individual-level job satisfaction in the BHPS data set is reported based
on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 (completely
satisfied). The employed workers are asked to rate the job satisfaction levels
regarding the total income, job security, the actual work itself, and hours
worked. The last question about job satisfaction is “Overall, how satisfied
or dissatisfied are you with your present job?”, which is again measured on
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the 1–7 scale and used as the “job satisfaction score” in our analysis. As we
explain above, we standardize the job satisfaction score around zero mean and
unit variance to achieve consistency across the job satisfaction measures we
use for the WERS and BHPS data sets.
For the individual-level observed characteristics, we control for gender, age,
education level, marital status, earnings, and pay comparisons. We collapse
the education-levels into seven broad groups as follows: higher degree refers
to postgraduate education, first degree refers to college education, A-level, O-
level, and other higher qualification refer to high school graduates of different
types (consistent with the education system in the UK), vocational qualifica-
tion refers to teaching, nursing, commercial, apprenticeship, and the certificate
of secondary education (CSE), and, finally, the ones with no qualification. The
earnings variable—usual gross pay per month: current job—is recorded as the
actual amount received and, thus, we simply take the natural logarithm of
this variable in our analysis. We also consider the “taste for working hours”
variable. Promotion opportunities is described by the binary variable taking
1 if the worker has access to promotion opportunities and 0 otherwise. The
rest of the variables—firm size, job status, relative earnings, and union mem-
bership—are constructed similar to their counterparts in our WERS sample.
Table (2.2) presents the summary statistics of the sample that we use in our
analysis. In order to be included into our sample, the respondent have to be
employed and report a job satisfaction score. The mean age of the respondents
is 40.4. Among the 6,428 observations, 47.4 percent are male, 57.3 percent are
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married, 4.4 percent have higher degree, 15.8 percent have first degree, another
12.6 percent have A-level degree, 17.6 percent have O-level degree, 30.8 percent
have other higher qualifications, 9.4 percent have vocational qualifications, and
the remaining 9.4 percent have no qualifications. Before standardization, the
mean job satisfaction score is approximately 5.4 out of 7, with a standard
deviation of 1.26. 79 percent are employed in full-time jobs. 63 percent are
employed in privately-owned firms. 32.8 percent prefer to work fewer hours.
48.6 percent are employed in small-size firms. See Table (2.2) for further
information on region- and industry-specific details. We generate group-level
variables based on our reference groups constructed as industry × region cells.
Below we describe how we construct our reference groups both in the WERS
and BHPS data sets.
2.3.3 Reference Groups
Our primary objective is to separately identify endogenous social effects and
contextual social effects in job satisfaction within a formal empirical model of
social interactions. We conceptualize the social interactions that we estimate as
the existence of “spillovers” in the society in the sense that the group-level job
satisfaction in one’s reference group affects the individual worker’s perception
of own job satisfaction. We perform this task at two levels with two different
data sets from the United Kingdom. First, we use the WERS data set to
estimate spillovers at the workplace level. And, second, we use the BHPS data
set to estimate job satisfaction spillovers at the local labor market level. The
WERS data set captures the social effects among co-workers, who are directly
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interacting. The BHPS data set, on the other hand, captures social effects
among individuals who are potentially interacting indirectly. As Bramoulle
et al. (2009) clearly state, this type of social effects is based on the idea that
“neighbors in the neighborhood do not affect me directly; what matters is the
neighborhood itself.”
WERS. The WERS data sets naturally offers establishment-level reference
groups; that is, all workers employed in a given establishment constitute the
reference group for each of the workers employed in that establishment. There
are 1,673 establishments in our WERS sample. Thus, the number of reference
groups is 1,673. The average group size is approximately 12 worker per es-
tablishment. This setting defines narrow reference groups hypothesizing that
social forces operate at the workplace level: workers in a given establishment
are exposed to similar work-specific conditions that shape their job satisfaction
perceptions. The group-level counterparts of the individual-level variables are
constructed taking averages at the workplace level. Similarly, the endogenous
social variable (the group-level job satisfaction score) is calculated by averaging
the job satisfaction scores within the workplace.
BHPS. For the BHPS data set, we construct industry × region cells as our
reference groups. In terms of our conceptualization of social interactions, this
means that we try to capture the social forces that operate among workers
who are geographically close to each other and who are potentially exposed
to similar local labor market conditions specific to the industries they belong
to. This is a common way of constructing reference groups in the empirical
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social interactions studies, particularly the ones handling large data sets. For
example, Luttmer (2005) utilizes the outgoing rotation groups feature of the
Current Population Survey and constructs industry × occupation cells to es-
timate the neighborhood effects of income on individual-level happiness. Sim-
ilarly, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) uses the German Socio-Economic Panel and
constructs education × age × region cells to estimate the impact of the group-
level income on individual-level subjective well-being. In a similar context,
Glaeser et al. (1996) construct region-specific cells on a lattice to estimate the
impact of neighbors’ criminal-activity decisions on the agent’s own decision to
participate in crime. In another example, Stutzer and Lalive (2004) use data
from Switzerland cantons and construct canton-level cells to estimate the effect
of social norm to work—roughly, the rate of employment in one’s neighbor-
hood—on how quickly the unemployed individual finds a job, probably due to
social pressure. The examples can be extended further. In all of these papers,
large reference groups are constructed to capture the peer influences in broad
social settings.
In our BHPS sample, the following twelve regions describe the geographical
clustering: 1) London, 2) South East, 3) South West, 4) East Anglia, 5) East
Midlands, 6) West Midlands, 7) North West, 8) North East, 9) Yorkshire &
Humberside, 10) Wales, 11) Scotland, and 12) Northern Ireland. Nine industry
categories are selected at one-digit level as follows: 1) energy & water supplies,
2) extraction of minerals & manufacture of metal goods, mineral products &
chemicals, 3) metal goods, engineering & vehicles, 4) other manufacturing in-
dustries, 5) construction, 6) distribution, hotels & catering (repairs), 7) trans-
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port & communication, 8) banking, finance, insurance, business services &
leasing, and 9) other services. At the end, there are 108 reference groups in
our BHPS sample. The average group size is approximately 60 workers per
industry × region cell.
2.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the estimation results, provide a detailed inter-
pretation of the estimates, perform robustness checks, and discuss the policy
implications. We use two data sets: WERS and BHPS. In WERS, establish-
ments are the reference groups, whereas, in BHPS, reference groups are defined
by the industry × region cells. We group our estimates under three categories:
individual-level coefficients, endogenous social effects, and contextual social
effects. Individual-level coefficients describe the impact of individual-level ob-
served covariates on the job satisfaction score. The endogenous social effect
refers to the effect of the mean job satisfaction—where the mean is calculated
at the group level—on the job satisfaction score. The contextual social effect
refers to the effect of group-level counterparts of the individual-level covariates
on the job satisfaction score. Below we discuss our estimates in detail. Note
that both the individual- and group-level job satisfaction scores are standard-
ized around mean zero and unit variance.
It will perhaps be useful to clearly explain how we present the results. We start
with a model, which we call the “baseline” case, relying on two strong assump-
tions: (i) group-level means of the key variables are calculated by including
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the individual’s own outcomes and/or characteristics and (ii) group-level fixed
effects are omitted. We acknowledge that these are strong assumptions and
can contaminate the estimates. We then proceed by relaxing each of these
assumptions. The final results will be the most realistic ones. This line of
reasoning will allow us to evaluate the potential biases that would be caused
by each of these assumptions.
2.4.1 Hierarchical Model
We start our analysis by estimating our core model: the hierarchical model of
social interactions given by Equation (2.11). The estimations are performed
both for the WERS & BHPS data sets. In the baseline specification, we
control for group-level effects by defining them as unobserved random effects.
We relax this assumption in Section 2.4.2, where we perform robustness checks.
We report the estimates in two forms. First, we document only the marginal
effects for WERS and BHPS given in Tables (2.4) and (2.5), respectively. The
marginal effects are readily interpretable as the social interactions estimates, so
they will be at the center of our analysis. Second, we deal with the interaction
terms. The coefficients of the interaction terms are useful, because they inform
us whether the social interactions effects are heterogeneous or not.
2.4.1.1 Marginal Effects
Below we separately report the marginal effects for individual-level coefficients,
endogenous social effects, and contextual social effects. As usual, the marginal
effects evaluate the interaction terms at their respective sample means.
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Estimates for the Individual-level Coefficients. Our estimates for the
individual-level coefficients are parallel to those reported in the previous empir-
ical literature on the determinants of job satisfaction [see, for example, Clark
(1996), Clark and Oswald (1996), and Taylor (2006)]. Specifically, for both
WERS and BHPS, we find that females, married workers, younger workers,
workers with higher earnings, workers earning more than the median wage
earner in the population, workers with greater access to promotion oppor-
tunities, and workers employed in smaller establishments are more satisfied
jobwise.19 The first two columns of Tables (2.4) and (2.5) report the estimates
of individual-level covariates for the WERS and BHPS data sets, respectively.
This paper focuses on estimating spillovers in job satisfaction; thus, the rest of
the paper aims to interpret the estimated social effects rather than providing
a lengthy discussion of the individual-level covariates.
Estimates for Endogenous Social Interactions. A group-level variable
is endogenous if its individual-level counterpart is the choice variable of inter-
est. Hence, the associated group-level variable can be defined as the effect of
other people’s behavior on individual-level behavior. This a classic example of
spillover externalities. The findings from our benchmark estimates verify that
there exist significant positive spillover externalities in job satisfaction; that is,
the group-level (i.e., mean) job satisfaction is positively related to individual-
level job satisfaction. To put it differently, an individual worker’s job satis-
faction level tend to be higher in a group of workers who are highly satisfied
19Note that the estimates for the promotion opportunities are only relevant for the BHPS,
since the WERS data set does not include a question regarding the promotion prospects of
the employees.
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jobwise. We document these effects for both the WERS and BHPS samples.
We find that one standard deviation increase in aggregate job satisfaction level
leads to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction at
the workplace level and 0.15 standard deviation increase in individual-level job
satisfaction at the local labor market level. The first line of the estimates both
in Tables (2.4) and (2.5) reports the numbers for endogenous spillovers for the
WERS and BHPS data sets, respectively. Job satisfaction is often associated
with workplace attitudes such as involvement in the organization, relatedness
with co-workers/customers/managers, attachment, motivation, shirking, ten-
dency to slow down work, absenteeism, etc. These attitudes form a workplace
“atmosphere” and jointly contribute to the formation of worker satisfaction
and performance. Our estimates confirm that the aggregate job satisfaction
level in a certain work environment can be regarded as a “social” variable and
may, in turn, affect individual-level job satisfaction significantly.
This result suggests that there are huge gains to policy interventions to increase
individual-level job satisfaction as there are large positive feedback effects from
group-level job satisfaction toward individual-level job satisfaction in the form
of spillover externalities.20 The degree of this feedback is larger at the work-
place level than local labor market level. Thus, enforcing job satisfaction
policies at the workplace level will likely be more effective than implementing
such policies at the local labor market level. This result is particularly impor-
tant, because it is reported in the literature that job satisfaction is positively
20Employers can stimulate social interactions among workers, which suggests that the
optimal design of worker groups/teams should also account for these social forces [Tumen
(2012)].
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related to worker productivity [see, for example, Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas
(2012)]. In terms of the magnitudes, Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas (2012) re-
port that one standard deviation increase in group-level job satisfaction raises
productivity per hours worked by 6.6 percent. This means that the existence
of spillover externalities introduces notable gains to increasing job satisfaction
at the individual level.
Estimates for the Contextual Effects. We control for a large set of con-
textual variables in our regressions. However, only a few of them produce
statistically significant coefficients. We start with the WERS results, in which
we report estimates for social interactions at the workplace level. Our WERS
regressions [see Table (2.4)] show that the Male, Age, Log Earnings, and Rela-
tive Earnings variables are subject to statistically significant contextual social
effects. To begin with, we show that working close to a group of workers with
a larger fraction of males increases job satisfaction at the workplace-level anal-
ysis. This result can be interpreted in several ways. It is well-documented
in the literature that females are more likely to be absent from work due to
illness-related reasons.21 If this is the case, workplace attitudes such as moti-
vation, attachment, and involvement might be weaker for females than males
due to these relatively more frequent breaks in their work attendance. As a
consequence, working in a group with a greater fraction of males might in-
crease motivation and, thus, job satisfaction. A second explanation might be
related to gender discrimination; that is, our finding can be interpreted as the
existence of distaste against women. However, we are cautious on this inter-
21Ichino and Moretti (2009) show that this may be related to menstrual cycles.
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pretation as we do not have additional empirical support for this claim in our
analysis. Apart from the contextual gender effects, we document that job sat-
isfaction is higher in groups with higher average worker age and this positive
impact becomes weaker as the average age goes up in our WERS sample. This
can be attributed—using the Mincerian language—to labor market experience.
Working in a group with a larger fraction of experienced workers may produce
external effects boosting job satisfaction and, thus, worker productivity.
We also find that earnings have statistically significant contextual effects in
our WERS regressions. The contextual earnings effect refers to the effect of
the mean earnings in one’s reference group on individual-level job satisfaction.
To comply with the conventions in the literature, we construct two earnings
variables: (1) the natural logarithm of earnings and (2) a dummy variable
indicating the earnings rank of the worker, i.e., relative earnings. As we report
in Table (2.4)], the average earnings in the reference group is negatively related
to the individual job satisfaction score. Moreover, working in a group with
a greater fraction workers earning more than the median wage also reduces
individual job satisfaction.22 This is consistent with the findings in the pay-
comparisons literature, which suggest that job satisfaction depends on relative
income comparisons [see, for example, Clark et al. (2009) and Card et al.
(2012)]. Our findings confirm the view that income is evaluated relative to
some comparison level based on the reference group and not only in absolute
terms. This is in line with the findings reported in the literature [see, e.g.,
Easterlin (1973)].
22So, instead of the Hirschman’s tunnel effect, we observe that envy/hatred is more likely
to be effective.
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For the BHPS analysis, we do not find any statistically significant contextual
effects for the Male, Age, Log Earnings, and Relative Earnings variables at
the local labor market level, unlike our workplace level analysis. This may be
due to the reason that individuals care less about the group-level exogenous
characteristics in larger reference groups. However, we do report a different
contextual effect at the local labor market level: the promotion opportunities,
a variable that does not exist in the WERS data set. Specifically, we find that
working in groups with a greater fraction of workers with access to promotion
opportunities reduces individual-level job satisfaction [see Table (2.5)]. This
can be attributed to competition: that is, if there is a large fraction of work-
ers in one’s reference group expecting promotions, then this might increase
excess competition in the work environment and, therefore, might reduce job
satisfaction. It is interesting, however, detecting this result at the local labor
market level. This may be suggesting that working in industries with harsher
competition conditions reduces individual-level job satisfaction. We do not
have results for this variable at the workplace level; however, if the competi-
tion hypothesis is true, we conjecture that the contextual effect of promotion
opportunities would be even stronger at the workplace level.
2.4.1.2 The Role of Heterogeneity
The discussion above focuses on the marginal effects of the variables and ig-
nores the magnitudes of the interaction terms. But, the interaction terms in
the hierarchical model may themselves yield interesting results. In particular,
the interaction terms might suggest whether the endogenous and/or contextual
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social effects exhibit any heterogeneity, i.e., whether the social interactions es-
timates depend on the environment in which the associated interactions take
place. For the sake of brevity, we perform this task only with the WERS data.
Our “social ecologies” model features two types of interaction terms. First, the
mg×Yg interaction indicates whether the endogenous social effect differs across
groups with different characteristics. For example, the effect of group-level
job satisfaction on individual-level job satisfaction may be different in groups
with different gender dominance structures or different education composi-
tions. Second, the Xig × Yg interaction indicates whether the individual-level
effects change with respect to group-level characteristics. For example, the
relationship between individual-level characteristics and the individual-level
job satisfaction scores may be different in groups with different characteristics.
Table (2.6) reports the full set of interaction terms in the first group. The
results provide interesting insights on the group-level heterogeneity structure.
Most importantly, we find that the endogenous social effects are stronger in
firms with a larger fraction of older and more educated workers. This sug-
gests that working in a group of individuals with higher human capital levels
exposes workers to stronger peer effects in job satisfaction. The second set
of interaction terms include so many variables that it would be inefficient to
report all of them. Instead, we prefer to mention verbally the most striking
estimates. We find some gender effects that worth mentioning. Table (2.4)
documents that job satisfaction is higher in groups with a greater fraction of
male workers. We find that this effect is much larger for male workers than
females. We also show that the negative relative income effect is felt much
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stronger by males than females. These patterns suggest that both endogenous
and contextual social effects are subject to a certain degree of heterogeneity in
the worker population.
It remains to check whether the interaction terms are jointly statistically sig-
nificant or not. This is equivalent to test the relevance of our identifying
assumption, which introduces non-linearities to the standard linear-in-means
model through incorporating interaction terms as in Equation (2.11). If the
interaction terms are jointly insignificant, then the model will favor the linear-
in-means model over the hierarchical model; therefore, our model will remain
fundamentally unidentified and would be subject to Manski’s criticism. We
test the joint significance of the interaction terms both for the WERS and
BHPS data sets using the F -test. For the WERS, the interaction terms are
statistically significant at 1 percent level with a p-value very close to zero. For
the BHPS, the interaction terms are still jointly statistically significant, but
the level of significance is 5 percent (with a p value around 0.045). This means
that the validity of our identifying assumption is roughly confirmed by both
of the data sets we use.
2.4.1.3 Linear-in-Means Model
Although the simple test we perform above favors the hierarchical model over
the linear-in-means model and although we are aware of the fact that the
linear-in-means models are potentially plagued with the reflection problem, it
will still be a useful exercise to get estimates from the linear-in-means model to
understand the extent to which the reflection problem could contaminate the
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estimates. The linear specification is given by Equation (2.1), which says that
the individual-level job satisfaction is a linear function of individual-level char-
acteristics, group-level characteristics, and group-level job satisfaction. Again,
for the sake of brevity, we perform this exercise only with the WERS data set.
Table (2.7) reports the linear-in-means estimates. We compare them to the
estimates for the hierarchical model given in Table (2.4). The most striking
difference is that the endogenous social effect is 0.423 in the hierarchical model,
while it is 0.514 in the linear-in-means model. This difference implies that the
linear-in-means model overestimates the endogenous social effect by around
22 percent, which is a non-negligibly large bias. The contextual effects are
also different; some differing only in magnitude, some differing in both sign
and magnitude. The punchline is that ignoring the reflection problem has a
potential to generate large biases in the estimates of social interactions in job
satisfaction. The reason is that when individual- and group-level outcomes are
simultaneously determined within groups, then the parameter estimates from
the linear-in-means model would just be a combination of the underlying struc-
tural parameters and the true social effects will be masked. The hierarchical
model offers a way to separately identify the social effects.
2.4.1.4 π = 0 Model
We also estimate the equation (2.11) where π = 0. If this exercise makes a dif-
ference regarding R2 and the endogenous social effect, then utilizing contextual-
dependent coefficients for identification strategy would be beneficial. In this
exercise, we simply do not control the interaction term group-level contextual
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variables and group-level job satisfaction. This equation looks similar to the
linear-in-means model except that it includes multiplicative interactions be-
tween group-level and individual-level contextual variables. This exercise is
performed only using the WERS data set.
ωig = β0 + β1Xig + β2Yg + Jmg + πYgmg + Y
′
gBXig + ug + εig , (2.13)
Table (2.9) reports the estimation result where π = 0. Again, we compare
these results with the result of the hierarchical model given in Table (2.4).
The endogenous social effect is 0.501 for the model that π = 0 while in the hi-
erarchical model, it is 0.423. We find that such a regression could overestimate
the endogenous social effect by around 18% and could alter the estimates for
other contextual effects. R2 of the model is also very small, which signalizes
the problem of model fitting.
2.4.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we perform several robustness checks for the results that
our hierarchical model produces. We carry out this task in two different ways.
First, we calculate the group-level means of the variables using an alternative
technique and, second, given the flexibility offered by this alternative formula-
tion, we propose a different way of controlling for group-level heterogeneity. It
is perhaps needed to mention at this stage that we are severely constrained by
data availability in extending the variety of these robustness exercises. Overall,
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the two alternative exercises presented below strongly suggest that the social
interactions estimates obtained from the baseline hierarchical model [see Table
(2.4)] are robust.
2.4.2.1 An Alternative Formulation of Group-Level Variables
Since the group sizes are, on average, small especially for the WERS data set,
one might suspect that the social interactions estimates reported in Table (2.4)
could depend on the way group-level means are calculated. In our baseline
calculations, the group-level means are calculated as the simple arithmetic
average of the individual-level variables. In particular, our original formulation
assumes that the group-level job satisfaction score that affects individual i’s job
satisfaction level also includes i’s own job satisfaction. This has two potential
deficiencies. First, if the groups are small, then this formulation will impose
a mechanical positive correlation between the individual- and group-level job
satisfaction scores, because a change in the individual-level score will be more
likely generate a sizable effect on group-level job satisfaction score. Second, it
is also plausible to say that the individual i in group g is exposed to a social
effect that is characterized by the mean behavior in the group, where the mean
is calculated excluding i. When the groups are large, including or excluding
the observation for i in calculating the group-level means should be less of a
concern, since the group means will be almost identical in both cases.
Based on these concerns, we reconstruct the group-level averages for each indi-
vidual, excluding the corresponding individual. We re-estimate the hierarchical
model based on these new group-level definitions and the results are presented
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in Table (2.9) in the form of marginal effects. The endogenous social effect,
which is 0.408, is only slightly smaller than the original estimate of 0.423.
The qualitative nature of the contextual effects also remain unchanged, with
the exception that the coefficients of the human capital variables are slightly
smaller and the coefficients of the absolute and relative earnings variables are
somewhat larger in Table (2.9) relative to the estimates reported in Table
(2.4). These results suggest that our estimates are robust to the changes in
the method chosen to calculate the group-level means.
2.4.2.2 Group Fixed Effects
Another potential problem with our baseline estimates is that group-level un-
observed heterogeneity is controlled only by assuming a random-effects struc-
ture in the error term. By definition, the random-effects model is based on
the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated with other covariates. Al-
though, this specification is useful in controlling for the fact that the error
term may exhibit within-group correlations, it would be inadequate in cap-
turing the group-level fixed effects, which are unobserved factors correlated
with the determinants of individual- and group-level variables. Fortunately,
the alternative calculation procedure introduced in Section 2.4.2.1 allows us
to incorporate the group-level fixed effects manually. Since the group-level
variables are calculated excluding i, these variables offer some variation within
the group. When such a variation exists, one can generate group dummies and
use these dummies as group fixed effects.23 We perform this task both for the
23To understand this point, suppose that there is a group of 10 workers and each of them
has received a score based on a certain test. If you calculate the group-level mean of the
test score by including everyone, then the mean test score will be the same for everyone in
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WERS and BHPS datasets.
For the WERS analysis, we re-estimate the hierarchical model by incorporating
these firm fixed effects in a regression in which the group-level variables are
calculated excluding the individual i. Table (2.10) demonstrates the results.
Strikingly, we find that the endogenous social effect is estimated to be 0.367,
which is somewhat lower than but still reasonably close to our original estimate
0.423. This estimate also supports the qualitative nature of our results, which
suggests that the social interactions in job satisfaction are strong at the firm
level.24 The signs and significance levels of other variables are also mostly
remained unaltered—except that the coefficient of the relative income variable
turned to insignificant after including group-level fixed effects. At the end,
we conclude that our original WERS estimates are robust to the inclusion of
firm-level fixed effects.
For the BHPS analysis, we again re-performed the estimations for our hier-
archical model after incorporating the industry-region fixed effects, where the
group-level variables are calculated excluding the individual i. Table (2.11)
documents the results. The original estimate for the endogenous social effect
was 0.147. We find that this estimate declined slightly and became 0.141 after
the group. If the individual i excludes his own test score in calculating the group-level mean
he faces, and if everyone does so, then the group-level means will be different for everyone
in the group. When there is individual-level variation in the key group-level variables, then
it becomes possible to include group-level fixed effects into the regressions. In the absence
of such a variation, the group-level fixed effects would be collinear with the group-level
means. In particular, the number of omitted firm dummies would be equal to the number of
group-level means included into the regression. Thus, the main coefficients of interest would
become uninterpretable.
24We would like to note that this approach is also not free of any problems. When the
group size is small, the accuracy of controlling for group-level heterogeneity via a dummy
variable will be low. So, from a “model selection” viewpoint, it is not clear if the model
with firm fixed effects should be preferred to the model that excludes the fixed effects.
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including the group-level fixed effects. Again, the qualitative nature of other
coefficients remains unaltered. This confirms that our BHPS estimates are
robust too.
2.4.2.3 Endogenous Group Sorting
Individuals who are more satisfied job-wise may sort together in the same refer-
ence group; however this sorting may not have an influence on the individual-
level job satisfaction. Moreover, unobserved characteristics may take place
before the sorting of individuals to the reference group, i.e., the value of the
firm has suddenly been increased, or a nice manager has arrived very recently.
Identifying sorting requires worker-firm match data. In the literature, this is-
sue has been widely investigated under whether or not productive workers are
employed more in productive jobs. Abowd et al. (1999) analyze the correlation
between firm and worker fixed effects from wage regressions. Based on their
method, there are several papers that tried to identify the sorting and to find
an insignificant or even negative correlation in fixed effects between workers
and firm types [Cahuc et al. (2004)]. These results are extracted from several
countries such as France, the U.S., Denmark, and Brazil. These papers suggest
that a positive assortative matching between workers and firms does not play a
crucial role in the labor market. However, Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) show
that the fixed effects approach is not able to identify the strength of sorting.
They propose another model to focus on the gain of sorting instead of the
sign of sorting, which can be identified from the wage data. The identification
comes solely from determining some notion of the size of the set of firms with
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which a worker matches. In our case, we have some limitations when analyz-
ing the issue. Identifying endogenous sorting requires panel employer-employee
match data whereas the WERS dataset is a cross section worker-firm match
data. Therefore, our results may suffer from endogenous group sorting.
2.4.2.4 Dependent Variable Check
We re-estimate the hierarchical model under two different dependent variables,
i.e., “overall job satisfaction”. One way is to construct the variable in a dif-
ferent way in the WERS data set, and the other way is to make a better
comparison of the WERS and the BHPS data set by combining the the same
type of job satisfaction related questions.
Our first dependent variable check is simply summing the five job satisfaction
question and creating a score between 7 and 3525, which gives more variability
across workers. The endogenous social effect of the model is 0.419, which is
slightly similar to the original model of 0.423 [See Table (2.12)]. The contextual
effects are also parallel with the original estimates.
Our second dependent variable check is to match the following job satisfaction
scores in the WERS and the BHPS. The questions that we make use of in
the WERS data set are “How satisfied are you with the amount of pay you
receive?, the job security?, the work itself?. There are similar questions in the
BHPS data set: “How satisfied are you with total pay?, the job security?, the
work itself? The endogenous social effect is 0.418 with the new constructed
job satisfaction variable in the WERS, and in the BHPS it is 0.14 [See Table
25We standardize the score around zero mean and unit variance to achieve consistency.
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(2.13) for the WERS and Table(2.14) for the BHPS]. These examples show the
robustness of our analyses regarding the dependent variable.
2.4.2.5 WERS—Industry × Region
Our reference group for the WERS data set is establishment-level; for the
BHPS data set, we construct industry × region cells. Although our main aim
is to understand the spillover effects in small and large interaction groups,
we would also like to provide an evidence of how the social interaction effect
varies with the size of the reference group. For that purpose, we replicate our
analysis using the WERS data set with a focus on the same reference group of
the BHPS.
In the WERS data sets, we collapse the industries in nine categories to achieve
the consistency with the BHPS. The regions are constructed with the same way
but in the WERS, Northern Ireland region is not available. At the end, we
have nine industries and eleven regions to construct the new reference group.
Note that in the WERS data set, the regions are recorded in the establishment-
level. When we look at the regional mean of job satisfaction of both data sets
in Table (2.3), we observe the similar pattern. London is the region, which
has the smallest mean of job satisfaction and Wales is the highest one for both
data sets.
Table (2.15) shows the estimation result; the endogenous social effect is 0.26 in
industry × region cells whereas it is recorded at 0.42 with the establishment-
level reference group. The endogenous social effect is smaller than the previous
reference group; however the spillover effect in job satisfaction is still larger
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than that in the BHPS data set. One reason could be that the variation
in region is smaller than the BHPS, given that the regions are recorded in
the workplace-level. However, this exercise still presents a consistency in the
results that social interactions in job satisfaction are higher in small groups.
When we analyze the contextual effects, the results in general are parallel with
the previous reference group—establishment-level— however the magnitude is
small.
2.4.2.6 Alternative Formulation of Reference Group
Another exercise that we run based on the reference group excludes the worker’s
own establishment in region × industry cells. The main reason of this exercise
is to decompose the effect coming from worker’s own establishment and the
effect coming from region × industry level. Since workers can interact outside
of their workplace in the BHPS data set, this may lead to more comprehensive
estimates from the WERS data set. Thereby, we first analyze the reference
group regarding region× industry, and then to decompose the effect, we reform
the reference group by excluding the worker’s own establishment.
We estimate the hierarchical model for the WERS data set, where the group-
level variables are calculated by region × industry cells excluding the individ-
ual’s own establishment. The endogenous social effect is 0.14 [see Table (2.16)],
which is lower than the previous estimate and is focused on region × industry
cells. The previous estimate is 0.26: this suggests that 0.12 is coming from the
establishment-level. This also supports the argument that social interactions
in job satisfaction are strong at the firm level.
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2.4.2.7 Establishment Size
There is a possibility that small establishments drive the result of higher en-
dogenous social effect in the workplace. To understand this, we reestimate
the hierarchical model across firm size: small firms, which are the number of
workers less than 50; medium firms are between 50 and 200 workers; and large
firms, which are higher than 200 workers. The endogenous social effect for
small firms, which is 0.432, is only slightly bigger than the original estimate
of 0.423. The endogenous social effect for medium and large establishments
are 0.415 and 0.410 respectively. The contextual effects yield the same result.
These results say that our estimates are robust across firm size26.
2.4.2.8 Job Satisfaction Components
To have a better understanding of the relative effect of the job satisfaction
component, we re-estimate the hierarchical model by Shapley decomposition.
The decomposition is estimated to find out what the marginal contributions of
different variables are. We apply the Shapley decomposition, by keeping the
individual job satisfaction as a composite index, and utilize the group average
values and interaction terms of job satisfaction components such as the sense
of achievement you get from the work, the scope for using your own initiative,
the amount of influence you have over the job, the training you receive, the
amount of pay you receive, the job security, and the work itself along with
other regressors. Shapley decomposition allows to consider all the possible
sequences to eliminate the explanatory variables.
26The results are available upon request.
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With the help of this example, we can observe which job satisfaction compo-
nent is more prominent in social interactions. We conduct this exercise only
with the WERS dataset. The greatest marginal impacts are “the amount of
pay you receive” and “the training you receive”27. Among these job satisfac-
tion components, the impact of the satisfaction with the scope for using your
own initiative is the weakest. These results suggest that social interactions in
job satisfaction are mostly driven by the satisfaction of payment. This indeed
asks the questions of whether this effect is coming from the “Hirschman’s Tun-
nel Effect” or income-comparison. This exercise has very interesting results
and opens doors for future research.
2.4.3 Policy Implications
It will perhaps be useful to put the policy implications of our results in a
nutshell. These results suggest that (1) there are large gains to policy in-
terventions to increase individual-level job satisfaction as there are significant
positive feedback effects from group-level job satisfaction toward individual-
level job satisfaction in the form of spillover externalities; (2) failing to account
for the spillover externalities in job satisfaction may lead us to mis-assess the ef-
fectiveness of job satisfaction policies; thus, the policy maker should internalize
these externalities; and (3) job satisfaction spillovers are much stronger at the
workplace level than local labor market level: therefore, designing/enforcing
job satisfaction policies at the workplace level will likely be more effective than
implementing such policies at the local labor market level.
27The results are available upon request.
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Macroeconomic factors such as GDP per capita, inflation, and unemployment
have an influence on the subjective well-being of the individual; the evidence
comes from a quarter of a million randomly sampled Europeans and Americans
from the 1970s to the 1990s [Di Tella et al. (2003)]. Since the subjective
well-being of the individual can be altered with the macroeconomic factor,
the same can also apply within the firm. In general, the situation of the
firm —such as profitability— has an impact on the workers’ job satisfaction
[Yee et al. (2008)]. Since the social interactions in job satisfaction in the
workplace are high, the impact of the situation of the firm on the worker’s job
satisfaction may be even higher than that. Moreover, there is vast literature
focusing on the implementation of teamwork to increase productivity in the
workplace [Hoegl and Gemuenden (2001)]. Since there is a significant and
positive relationship between job satisfaction and productivity [Boeckerman
and Ilmakunnas (2012)], one may increase the efficiency in team work not only
to increase the job satisfaction of the individual but also through to increase
social interaction among workers. As we observed from the break-down of the
job satisfaction components, social interactions in job satisfaction are mostly
induced by satisfaction from payment. This result has a possible labor policy
market implication after analyzing whether this satisfaction is coming from
income-comparison or the “Hirschman’s Tunnel Effect”.
Although we find that the job satisfaction spillovers are particularly strong
at the workplace level, our results also suggest that it would be misleading to
exclude the possibility of spillovers in broader reference groups. In other words,
regional aspects of working life and conditions in the local labor markets may
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also induce interactions among people that can exhibit non-negligible social
effects.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
There is a large literature arguing that peer effects exist in various labor market
outcomes including productivity, wages, absenteeism, and learning (or knowl-
edge spillovers). We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, this
is the first paper in the literature testing the existence of job satisfaction
spillovers. We show that there exist significant positive spillovers in job sat-
isfaction. Second, we perform our analysis at two different aggregation levels
using two different data sets from the United Kingdom. We find that the job
satisfaction spillovers are almost three times stronger at the workplace level
than local labor market level (defined in terms of industry × region cells).
This implies that although job satisfaction spillovers are strong among nar-
rowly defined worker groups, it would be misleading to exclude the possibility
of spillovers in broader reference groups. In other words, regional aspects of
working life and conditions in the local labor markets may also induce interac-
tions among people that can exhibit non-negligible social effects. Finally, we
make a methodological contribution to the empirical literature by resolving the
identification problem using an intuitive insight from the hierarchical models
of social processes. Specifically, we hypothesize that our parameters of inter-
est are determined within the social environments they originate from. Under
reasonable specifications, this logic implies introducing certain cross-product
terms into the standard estimating equations.
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We conclude that there are sizable social interactions in job satisfaction that
should not be ignored in assessing policy effectiveness. The policy makers
should internalize these spillover externalities. Our estimates also provide
guidance on the question “at which level job satisfaction spillovers should be
internalized.” We argue that firms should design and implement their own job
satisfaction policies rather than relying on more general policies or institutional
regulations that could only be enforced at the local labor market level (or
industry level).
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics—WERS
Variable Mean Std.Dev
Job satisfaction 4.20 2.11





Higher degree 0.009 0.092
First degree 0.033 0.18
‘A’-level 0.273 0.446
‘O’-level 0.238 0.426
Vocational qual. 0.446 0.497
Log earnings 5.692 0.74
Relative earnings 0.518 0.5
Working hours 0.656 0.475
Job-level Characteristics
Private sector 0.365 0.481
Public sector 0.551 0.497
Union membership 0.462 0.499
Small-size establishment 0.324 0.468
Medium-size establishment 0.318 0.466
Large-size establishment 0.358 0.48
# of observations 20,035
# of workplaces/establishments 1,673
Notes: Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 data set is used to
construct this table.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics—BHPS
Variable Mean Std.Dev
Job satisfaction 5.40 1.26





Higher degree 0.044 0.205
First degree 0.158 0.365
‘A’-level 0.126 0.332
‘O’-level 0.176 0.381
Other higher qual. 0.308 0.462
Vocational qual. 0.094 0.292
No qual. 0.094 0.291
Log earnings 6.907 0.707
Relative earnings 0.531 0.499
Job-level Characteristics
Union membership 0.331 0.412
Promotion opportunities 0.499 0.5
Full-time job 0.79 0.407
Private sector 0.63 0.48
Public sector 0.22 0.42
Prefer to work fewer hours 0.328 0.47
Prefer to work more hours 0.054 0.226
Prefer to contain same hours 0.618 0.486
Small-size establishment 0.486 0.5
Medium-size establishment 0.216 0.411
Large-size establishment 0.299 0.458
Industries
Energy-water supplies 0.036 0.186
Extraction-manufacture 0.074 0.262
Metal goods-engineering 0.046 0.21
Other manufacturing 0.058 0.235
Construction 0.178 0.383
Distribution, hotels, catering 0.096 0.295
Transport-communication 0.196 0.397
Banking-finance 0.254 0.435
Other services 0.061 0.239
Regions
London 0.05 0.219
South East 0.114 0.318
South West 0.054 0.226
East Anglia 0.024 0.154
East Midlands 0.052 0.222
West Midlands 0.046 0.209
Northwest 0.066 0.249
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.054 0.226
North East 0.037 0.189
Wales 0.148 0.355
Scotland 0.188 0.391
Northern Ireland 0.166 0.372
# of observations 6,428
Notes: British Household Panel Survey 2004 cross-section is used to construct this
table.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics—Job Satisfaction score over region
Job Satisfaction WERS BHPS
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
London 4.33 0.14 5.28 0.08
South East 4.57 0.08 5.38 0.05
South West 4.55 0.09 5.38 0.06
East Anglia 4.30 0.09 5.31 0.13
East Midlands 4.64 0.01 5.51 0.06
West Midlands 4.35 0.21 5.44 0.77
Northwest 4.55 0.07 5.32 0.07
Yorkshire-Humberside 4.40 0.09 5.38 0.71
North East 4.33 0.14 5.31 0.92
Wales 4.65 0.12 5.44 0.47
Scotland 4.34 0.08 5.34 0.41
Northern Ireland - - 5.57 0.04
Std. Job Satisfaction WERS BHPS
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
London 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.06
South East 0.17 0.04 -0.02 0.03
South West 0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.05
East Anglia 0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.10
East Midlands 0.21 0.05 0.09 0.05
West Midlands 0.7 0.04 0.03 0.06
Northwest 0.16 0.03 -0.07 0.05
Yorkshire-Humberside 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.05
North East 0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.07
Wales 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.03
Scotland 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.03
Northern Ireland - - 0.13 0.03
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Table 2.4: Estimation results—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.423*** (0.007)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.160*** (0.017) 0.157*** (0.038)
Married 0.063*** (0.016) -0.075 (0.051)
Age -0.031*** (0.005) 0.026** (0.013)
Age-squared/100 0.039*** (0.005) -0.034** (0.015)
First degree 0.147 (0.161) 0.094 (0.341)
‘A’-level 0.265* (0.150) -0.073 (0.307)
‘O’-level 0.298** (0.500) -0.099 (0.305)
Vocational qual. 0.430*** (0.149) -0.211 (0.302)
Log earnings 0.232*** (0.022) -0.203*** (0.032)
Relative earnings 0.083*** (0.021) -0.093* (0.057)
Working hours -0.076*** (0.020) 0.047 (0.044)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.003 (0.028)
Public sector – – -0.004 (0.027)
Not union member – – -0.015 (0.030)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.003 (0.017)
Large establishment – – -0.006 (0.017)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1172
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.5: Estimation results—BHPS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.147*** (0.028)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.172*** (0.030) 0.328 (0.244)
Married 0.161*** (0.027) 0.368 (0.303)
Age -0.028*** (0.007) 0.094 (0.070)
Age-squared/100 0.039*** (0.009) -0.144* (0.084)
Higher degree 0.262** (0.102) -1.033 (0.771)
First degree 0.194** (0.099) -1.048 (0.742)
‘A’-level 0.142 (0.091) -0.701 (0.602)
‘O’-level 0.235** (0.094) -0.889 (0.671)
Other higher qual. 0.137 (0.096) -0.888 (0.788)
Vocational qual. 0.052 (0.094) -1.152 (0.790)
Log earnings 0.119*** (0.035) -0.198 (0.193)
Relative earnings 0.111*** (0.038) -0.233 (0.423)
Job characteristics
Private sector -0.025 (0.083) 0.196 (0.272)
Public sector -0.127 (0.096) 0.082 (0.287)
Union membership -0.060* (0.033) 0.178 (0.200)
Promotion opportunities 0.282*** (0.026) -0.430* (0.236)
Full-time job -0.183*** (0.044) -0.244 (0.445)
Prefer to work fewer hours -0.393*** (0.027) 0.276 (0.279)
Medium-size establishment -0.181*** (0.033) 0.310 (0.337)
Large establishment -0.162*** (0.033) -0.052 (0.273)
# of observations 6,428
R-squared 0.1098
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group level, are reported in parentheses.
Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document
the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document
those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). The
coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.”
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Table 2.6: Group-level interaction terms—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
INTERACTION TERMS (mg × Yg) – Hierarchical model
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error)
Individual characteristics
mg × Yg (Male) 0.012 (0.085)
mg × Yg (Married) 0.011 (0.103)
mg × Yg (Age) 0.044* (0.024)
mg × Yg (Age-squared/100) -0.049* (0.029)
mg × Yg (First degree) 0.928* (0.467)
mg × Yg (‘A’-level) 0.847* (0.416)
mg × Yg (‘O’-level) 0.864 (0.567)
mg × Yg (Vocational qual.) 0.710* (0.386)
mg × Yg (Log earnings) 0.039 (0.054)
mg × Yg (Relative earnings) -0.119 (0.096)
mg × Yg (Working hours) -0.151* (0.083)
Establishment/job characteristics
mg × Yg (Private sector) 0.116 (0.081)
mg × Yg (Public sector) 0.042 (0.078)
mg × Yg (Not union member) 0.127* (0.065)
mg × Yg (Medium-size establishment) -0.122** (0.049)
mg × Yg (Large establishment) -0.079 (0.053)
# of observations 20,035
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for.
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Table 2.7: Linear-in-means model—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
Linear-in-means model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.514*** (0.020)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.141*** (0.017) -0.031 (0.030)
Married 0.083*** (0.016) 0.076** (0.037)
Age -0.029*** (0.004) 0.008 (0.009)
Age-squared/100 0.039*** (0.005) -0.009 (0.011)
First degree -0.062 (0.080) -0.231 (0.212)
‘A’-level 0.031 (0.072) -0.277 (0.178)
‘O’-level 0.039 (0.074) -0.445** (0.176)
Vocational qual. 0.170** (0.074) -0.439** (0.173)
Log earnings 0.136*** (0.020) -0.099*** (0.026)
Relative earnings 0.137*** (0.021) -0.016 (0.046)
Working hours -0.066*** (0.020) 0.031 (0.034)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.018 (0.020)
Public sector – – -0.044** (0.018)
Not union member – – -0.102*** (0.021)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.032** (0.013)
Large establishment – – -0.070*** (0.014)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.083
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). Since the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS
(i.e., the characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.8: π=0—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
Linear-in-means model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.501*** (0.016)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.150*** (0.017) 0.145*** (0.040)
Married 0.070*** (0.016) 0.068** (0.040)
Age -0.031*** (0.004) 0.008 (0.009)
Age-squared/100 0.039*** (0.005) -0.009 (0.011)
First degree 0.120 (0.140) 0.080 (0.207)
‘A’-level 0.200 (0.190) -0.103 (0.178)
‘O’-level 0.210 (0.119) -0.225** (0.176)
Vocational qual. 0.296** (0.500) -0.239** (0.173)
Log earnings 0.200*** (0.020) -0.105*** (0.026)
Relative earnings 0.103*** (0.021) -0.090*** (0.025)
Working hours -0.070*** (0.020) 0.060** (0.034)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.010 (0.025)
Public sector – – -0.033* (0.025)
Not union member – – -0.083** (0.016)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.026** (0.013)
Large establishment – – -0.034** (0.014)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.090
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). Since the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS
(i.e., the characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.9: Group means exclude i—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model with group means excluding i.
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.408*** (0.008)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.143*** (0.021) 0.181*** (0.041)
Married 0.086*** (0.020) -0.069 (0.053)
Age -0.038*** (0.006) 0.028** (0.014)
Age-squared/100 0.044*** (0.006) -0.036** (0.016)
First degree 0.122 (0.172) 0.083 (0.366)
‘A’-level 0.192 (0.177) -0.084 (0.357)
‘O’-level 0.243** (0.487) -0.109 (0.352)
Vocational qual. 0.380** (0.195) -0.254 (0.342)
Log earnings 0.245*** (0.021) -0.211*** (0.033)
Relative earnings 0.097*** (0.022) -0.096* (0.058)
Working hours -0.066*** (0.018) 0.039 (0.046)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.001 (0.032)
Public sector – – -0.005 (0.029)
Not union member – – -0.028 (0.034)
Medium-size establishment – – 0.004 (0.022)
Large establishment – – -0.002 (0.021)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1165
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.10: Group means exclude i, firm fixed effects included—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model with group means excluding i.
Firm fixed effects are included.
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.367*** (0.026)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.096*** (0.026) 0.149*** (0.051)
Married 0.081*** (0.025) -0.043 (0.062)
Age -0.032*** (0.010) 0.023* (0.015)
Age-squared/100 0.035*** (0.011) -0.027* (0.017)
First degree 0.099 (0.192) 0.052 (0.392)
‘A’-level 0.161 (0.197) -0.061 (0.422)
‘O’-level 0.203 (0.381) -0.089 (0.386)
Vocational qual. 0.320* (0.191) -0.199 (0.401)
Log earnings 0.211*** (0.027) -0.188*** (0.057)
Relative earnings 0.091*** (0.024) -0.085 (0.072)
Working hours -0.056** (0.029) 0.029 (0.051)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.001 (0.037)
Public sector – – 0.012 (0.046)
Not union member – – -0.041 (0.066)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.016 (0.052)
Large establishment – – 0.007 (0.053)
Firm fixed effects Included
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1163
Notes:*, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics. Firm-level fixed
effects are included.
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Table 2.11: Group means exclude i, industry-region cell fixed effects in-
cluded—BHPS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Industry-region cell fixed effects are included.
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.141*** (0.031)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.151*** (0.036) 0.216 (0.301)
Married 0.146*** (0.031) 0.221 (0.441)
Age -0.027*** (0.008) 0.054 (0.091)
Age-squared/100 0.037*** (0.010) -0.066 (0.097)
Higher degree 0.251** (0.107) -1.201 (0.894)
First degree 0.183* (0.111) -1.103 (0.801)
‘A’-level 0.110 (0.103) -0.755 (0.792)
‘O’-level 0.216* (0.124) -0.904 (0.687)
Other higher qual. 0.109 (0.122) -1.001 (0.904)
Vocational qual. 0.021 (0.127 -1.202 (0.905)
Log earnings 0.111*** (0.037) -0.123 (0.240)
Relative earnings 0.104*** (0.040) -0.175 (0.501)
Job characteristics
Private sector -0.029 (0.084) 0.101 (0.303)
Public sector -0.110 (0.106) 0.044 (0.401)
Union membership -0.029 (0.041) 0.099 (0.386)
Promotion opportunities 0.211*** (0.052) -0.211 (0.388)
Full-time job -0.141*** (0.054) -0.178 (0.489)
Prefer to work fewer hours -0.288*** (0.051) 0.200 (0.476)
Medium-size establishment -0.149*** (0.037) 0.234 (0.356)
Large establishment -0.141*** (0.036) -0.012 (0.298)
Industry-region fixed effects Included
# of observations 6,428
R-squared 0.1065
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.”
Group-level fixed effects are included.
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Table 2.12: Job Satisfaction Score (7-35)—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.419*** (0.007)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.158*** (0.016) 0.154*** (0.038)
Married 0.065*** (0.016) -0.072 (0.050)
Age -0.029*** (0.005) 0.024** (0.012)
Age-squared/100 0.039*** (0.005) -0.034** (0.015)
First degree 0.152 (0.160) 0.090 (0.343)
‘A’-level 0.262* (0.152) -0.077 (0.305)
‘O’-level 0.300** (0.502) -0.098 (0.303)
Vocational qual. 0.433*** (0.150) -0.212 (0.301)
Log earnings 0.229*** (0.023) -0.201*** (0.032)
Relative earnings 0.080*** (0.022) -0.090* (0.057)
Working hours -0.073*** (0.020) 0.045 (0.043)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.003 (0.026)
Public sector – – -0.005 (0.025)
Not union member – – -0.016 (0.031)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.003 (0.017)
Large establishment – – -0.007 (0.017)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1168
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.13: Aggregation of Job Satisfaction Components—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.418*** (0.007)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.164*** (0.017) 0.155*** (0.041)
Married 0.068*** (0.017) -0.073 (0.052)
Age -0.030*** (0.006) 0.027** (0.013)
Age-squared/100 0.039*** (0.005) -0.034** (0.015)
First degree 0.170** (0.073) 0.111* (0.051)
‘A’-level 0.190** (0.099) -0.040** (0.037)
‘O’-level 0.213** (0.0.94) -0.050 (0.033)
Vocational qual. 0.235** (0.095) -0.034 (0.032)
Log earnings 0.262*** (0.103) -0.223*** (0.032)
Relative earnings 0.099*** (0.035) -0.089* (0.057)
Working hours -0.070*** (0.023) 0.052 (0.043)
Establishment/job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.002 (0.024)
Public sector – – -0.005 (0.026)
Not union member – – -0.017 (0.030)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.003 (0.016)
Large establishment – – -0.009 (0.020)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1160
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or
group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only
group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.14: Aggregation of Job Satisfaction Components—BHPS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.140*** (0.030)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.160*** (0.035) 0.220 (0.303)
Married 0.150*** (0.030) 0.205 (0.442)
Age -0.028*** (0.007) 0.054 (0.093)
Age-squared/100 0.035*** (0.009) -0.063 (0.095)
Higher degree 0.253** (0.106) -1.207 (0.878)
First degree 0.180* (0.110) -1.110 (0.860)
‘A’-level 0.109 (0.100) -0.750 (0.787)
‘O’-level 0.212* (0.120) -0.809 (0.680)
Other higher qual. 0.103 (0.120) -0.979 (0.923)
Vocational qual. 0.020 (0.128) -1.223 (0.925)
Log earnings 0.113*** (0.035) -0.125 (0.220)
Relative earnings 0.101*** (0.039) -0.170 (0.488)
Job characteristics
Private sector -0.032 (0.088) 0.102 (0.301)
Public sector -0.115 (0.109) 0.043 (0.405)
Union membership -0.027 (0.043) 0.069 (0.366)
Promotion opportunities 0.210*** (0.050) -0.199 (0.364)
Full-time job -0.139*** (0.055) -0.164 (0.449)
Prefer to work fewer hours -0.300*** (0.049) 0.183 (0.446)
Medium-size establishment -0.153*** (0.040) 0.223 (0.346)
Large establishment -0.140*** (0.039) -0.010 (0.248)
Industry-region fixed effects Included
# of observations 6,428
R-squared 0.1088
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.”
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Table 2.15: Industry × Region—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Endogenous social effect
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.26*** (0.029)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.121*** (0.047) 0.133 (0.531)
Married 0.265*** (0.029) 0.400 (0.361)
Age -0.029*** (0.009) 0.051 (0.091)
Age-squared/100 0.043*** (0.010) -0.034 (0.131)
First degree 0.141* (0.079) -1.139 (0.826)
‘A’-level 0.102 (0.059) -0.842 (0.792)
‘O’-level 0.97 (0.054) -0.853 (0.763)
Vocational qual. 0.052 (0.033) -1.378 (0.935)
Log earnings 0.130*** (0.046) -0.324*** (0.141)
Relative earnings 0.109*** (0.049) -0.199* (0.105)
Job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.002 (0.024)
Public sector – – -0.005 (0.026)
Not union member – – -0.017 (0.030)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.003 (0.016)
Large establishment – – -0.009 (0.020)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1155
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also group-level
characteristics because industry × region cells are recorded in the firm-level.) we
drop the individual-level coefficients and report only group-level estimates for the
establishment/job characteristics.
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Table 2.16: Alternative Formulation of Reference Group—WERS
Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)
MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model
Individual level Group level
Covariate Coefficient (St. Error) Coefficient (St. Error)
Mean job satisfaction (std) – – 0.14*** (0.027)
Individual characteristics
Male -0.110*** (0.048) 0.104 (0.423)
Married 0.132** (0.059) 0.386 (0.343)
Age -0.024*** (0.005) 0.049 (0.091)
Age-squared/100 0.040*** (0.011) -0.029 (0.108)
First degree 0.120** (0.054) -1.125 (0.816)
‘A’-level 0.76 (0.053) -0.830 (0.783)
‘O’-level 0.169 (0.142) -0.860 (0.745)
Vocational qual. 0.032 (0.021) -1.370 (0.924)
Log earnings 0.121*** (0.028) -0.303*** (0.138)
Relative earnings 0.110*** (0.015) -0.190* (0.97)
Job characteristics
Private sector – – -0.001 (0.022)
Public sector – – -0.005 (0.028)
Not union member – – -0.021 (0.033)
Medium-size establishment – – -0.001 (0.014)
Large establishment – – -0.006 (0.019)
# of observations 20,035
R-squared 0.1153
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in
parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two
columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two
columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions
estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since
the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the
characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also group-level
characteristics because industry × region cells are recorded in the firm-level.) we








There is a vast literature documenting significant day-of-the-week effects in
subjective well-being. Empirical studies find that individuals tend to report
lower levels of happiness on Sundays and/or Mondays, whereas they tend to
report higher job satisfaction levels on Fridays and/or Saturdays than the
other days of the week. Recent breakthrough studies confirming the empirical
relevance of the day-of-the-week effects in this literature include Taylor (2006),
Akay and Martinsson (2009), and Helliwell and Wang (2013)1. These are
1Specifically, Taylor (2006) uses the BHPS data and documents that those who are
interviewed on Fridays report higher levels of job satisfaction and lower levels of mental
stress than those interviewed in the middle of the week. Akay and Martinsson (2009) test
the same hypothesis using the GSOEP data and the result yields a ‘blue” Sunday. Helliwell
and Wang (2013) utilize the Gallup/Healthways U.S. daily poll to examine the differences
in the dynamics of two key measures of subjective well-being: emotions and life evaluation.
They find no day-of-the-week effect for life evaluations, but significantly more happiness,
enjoyment, and laughter; while significantly less worry, sadness, and anger on weekend
than on weekdays. Earlier studies on this topic include Rossi and Rossi (1977), Stone,
Hedges, Neale, and Satin (1985), Kennedy-Moore, Greenberg, Newman, and Stone (1992)
and Egloff, Tausch, Kohlmann, and Krohne (1995). See Csikszentmihalyi and Hunter (2003)
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the widely-agreed day-of-the-week patterns extracted from the main micro-
level datasets including large-scale ones such as the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (GSOEP), and
Gallup/Healthways polls as well as several small-scale surveys. The observed
patterns are often attributed to the “circaseptum rhytms” (i.e., seven day
cycles) hypothesis studied in the behavioral psychology literature [Larsen and
Kasimatis (1990, 1991) and Croft and Walker (2001)]. Overall, this literature
suggests that well-being is subject to mood fluctuations and has a highly state-
dependent nature.
These findings have important implications for economic modeling. The ab-
stract concept of “utility” is at the heart of modern economics, but the main
problem with this concept is that there is no direct measure of utility. In-
stead, several proxies are used to measure utility. In particular, self-reported
well-being is a widely-agreed proxy on various aspects of individual utility.
For example, Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008)
argue that self-reported happiness scores can be used as a general measure to
proxy individual-level utility and they provide detailed reviews of the related
literature. Similarly, Clark and Oswald (1996) argue that the self-reported job
satisfaction score is a direct measure of individual-level utility derived from the
current job. The results reported in the day-of-the-week effects literature im-
ply that utility—as it is proxied by the subjective well-being scores—depends
on the events and circumstances that affect individuals even for only a very
short period of time. In other words, this literature suggests that utility is not
and Pettengill (2003) for literature surveys.
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necessarily stable and it is subject to mood fluctuations2. The main principle
behind this argument is that individuals assess their well-being at any given
moment over time [Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz (1999)]. However, this is
in stark contrast with the neoclassical tradition—in particular, the Beckerian
tradition—assuming stable preferences that do not often change over time and
across states [Becker (1976)]. Although the stable preferences assumption is
no longer a rigid requirement of neoclassical analysis3, there is still consider-
able emphasis on preferences that do not quickly change over time or across
states—otherwise, every economic phenomenon could be explained by quickly
changing preferences, which would easily be labelled as a tautological state-
ment.
In this paper, we ask if these day-of-the-week estimates for job satisfaction
and happiness measures suffer from selection bias. We focus on two well-being
categories: happiness and job satisfaction. Sundays and/or Mondays are often
regarded as “blue”, so individuals are, on average, unhappy on these days.
Fridays and/or Saturdays are the days in which self-reported job satisfaction
is, on average, the highest. This is a sensible question because it may well be
the case that individuals who are interviewed on Fridays and Saturdays are
mostly the ones who enjoy working hard during the week and more relaxed
days like Fridays or Saturdays are the only available time for them to respond
the survey. Similarly, it may be the case that individuals who are interviewed
on Sundays represent an oversample of those doing housework and, thus, tend
2That individual-level well-being significantly varies across the days of the week is an
extreme version of short-term state dependency.
3See Becker (1976)
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to report lower happiness levels. Alternatively, individuals who are not working
hard throughout the week can prefer to take the survey on Sundays instead
of resting. On Mondays, responding the survey could be a good reason for
procrastination due to the overload of beginning of new week. These types
of individuals can be unsatisfied with their jobs or their lives in general. If
there is selectivity, then this would weaken the argument that individual-level
“mood” regularly fluctuates over the days of the week. Instead, the existence
of selectivity would suggest that the changes in self-reported well-being scores
over the week likely come from the changes in the composition of interviewees
over the week based on their unobserved characteristics.
We employ a standard Heckman (1979) selection-correction procedure to test
the existence of selection bias. In other words, we formally examine if sub-
jective well-being is correlated with unobserved characteristics that lead the
individuals to take the interview on some specific days of the week. We find
significant positive selection both for job satisfaction and happiness measures.
Specifically, we find that the ones interviewed on Fridays and Saturdays tend
to report higher job satisfaction than a random sample drawn from the popu-
lation of employed workers with a comparable set of observed characteristics
would report. For happiness, we find that those interviewed on Sundays and
Mondays tend to report lower happiness levels than a random sample drawn
from the population of employed workers with a comparable set of observed
characteristics would report.
We move one step further and calculate various treatment effects using the
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techniques summarized by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b), which enables us
to attribute causal meanings to our estimates. We focus on average treatment
effect (ATE), treatment on the treated (TT), and treatment on the untreated
(TUT). In our context, “treatment” refers to taking the interview on a Friday
or Saturday for job satisfaction analysis and Sunday or Monday for happiness
analysis. We find that the average TT is significantly larger than the ATE,
indicating that there is non-random sorting on unobservables across the days
of the week. The difference between TT and ATE is a sorting gain [Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005)]; that is, TT is the average gain for those who sort into
treatment compared to what the average person would gain. For job satisfac-
tion, our results suggest that, on average, individuals who are interviewed on a
Friday or Saturday have unobserved characteristics that make them more likely
to choose Friday or Saturday as the day of interview. Similarly, for happiness,
individuals who are interviewed on a Sunday or Monday have unobserved char-
acteristics that make them more likely to choose Sunday or Saturday as the
day of interview.
We conclude that the day of the week effects reported in the literature are
likely to be biased and, therefore, should be treated cautiously. Our interpre-
tation of this result is that there is a considerable individual-level unobserved
heterogeneity determining well-being scores, and the compositional changes in
interviewees in terms of these heterogeneous factors drive most of the observed
differences is self-reported well-being across the days of the week. Our find-
ings suggest that the magnitude of the selection bias originated from these
compositional shifts is so large that there is only little room for the “mood
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fluctuations” argument.
The selection-corrected estimates of the determinants of self-reported job sat-
isfaction and happiness scores allow us to understand the channels through
which the selection process operates. For job satisfaction, gender, marital sta-
tus, and job permanency status are the main channels. In the raw regressions,
females, married workers, and permanent workers are more satisfied with their
jobs than males, non-married workers, and temporary workers. In selection-
corrected regressions, males, non-married workers, and temporary workers in-
terviewed on a Friday are Saturday are systematically more satisfied jobwise
than the ones interviewed on the remaining days. For happiness, education,
job contractual term, being a public versus private sector worker, firm size,
and relative income are the main channels through which the selection pro-
cess operates. The selection-corrected estimates suggest that workers with
graduate education, seasonal workers, public sector workers, workers in small
firms, and workers earning relatively less than the others in their reference
groups who are interviewed on a Sunday or Monday are systematically less
happy than the ones interviewed on the remaining days. After correcting for
selectivity, we observe that the well-documented results in the empirical lit-
erature—such as, married are happier than non-married; there is a U -shaped
relationship between age and well-being; women report higher well-being than
men, etc.—suffer from selection bias.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes our data. Section
3.3 describes our econometric model and formulates the selection-correction
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procedure as well as the treatment effect parameters. Section 3.4 discusses the
results in depth. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
We use the latest (2008) release of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
in our analysis. The BHPS provides information on individual, household, and
job/employer related characteristics from 1991 to 2008 in the Great Britain,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It yearly follows a nationally rep-
resentative sample of households, interviews every adult member of sampled
households, and assigns a unique identification number for each interviewer.
The date of interview is recorded as day-month-year; the day-of-the-week on
which an interview occurs. Eighteen waves of data are available. Due to
changes in the measurement instrument in Wave 1, the subjective well-being
scores are higher in Wave 1 than those in other waves [Rose (1999)]. We ac-
cordingly drop Wave 1 from our analysis and use the data from Wave 2 to
Wave 18. Our analysis focuses on the working population only, because the
day-of-the-week patterns are more prevalent for the employed.
The individual-level job satisfaction in the BHPS dataset is reported based
on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 (completely
satisfied). On each interview, the employed workers are asked to rate their
job satisfaction levels regarding the promotion prospects, total income, rela-
tionship with boss, job security, able to use their initiatives in the work, the
actual work itself, and hours worked. The last question about job satisfaction
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is “Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job?”, which
is again measured on the 1–7 scale and named the “overall job satisfaction.”
This is a direct measure of individuals’ utility derived from their current job
[Clark and Oswald (1996)]. We use this overall measure in our analysis.
Happiness/psychological well-being is derived from the General Health Ques-
tionnaire (GHQ) in the BHPS. The GHQ is widely used in the United Kingdom
as a self-completion assessment measure of minor psychiatric morbidity [Gold-
berg and Williams (1988), McCabe, Thomas, Brazier, and Coleman (1996)].
This is a reliable indicator of mental distress [Argyle (2001)] and has been used
extensively in the medical literature [Goldberg (1972), Goldberg (1978)]. The
GHQ measures whether a respondent suffers from a health problem related to
anxiety or depression (available at all waves) and overall life satisfaction scores
(from wave 6 onwards). The following questions have been asked in the GHQ
to measure happiness/psychological well-being. Have you recently:
1. Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing?
2. Lost much sleep over worry?
3. Felt that you are playing a useful part in things?
4. Felt capable of making decisions about things?
5. Felt constantly under strain?
6. Felt you couldn’t overcome your difficulties?
7. Been able to enjoy your normal day to day activities?
8. Been able to face up to your problems?
9. Been feeling unhappy and depressed?
10. Been losing confidence in yourself?
11. Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?
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12. Been feeling reasonably happy all things considered?
Answers are coded on a four-point scale: from “Disagree strongly” (coded 1)
to “Agree strongly” (coded 4). The questions 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 12 are coded
in the reverse order. The literature typically brings these scores together to
provide an aggregate GHQ mental distress score. This final aggregate measure
ranges from 12 to 48 [Taylor (2006), Hu, Stewart-Brown, Twigg, and Weich
(2007)]. This approach is known as the “Likert Scale”. Low scores corre-
spond to low levels of stress/depression (i.e., high feelings of well-being and
happiness). We follow this convention and construct our happiness measure
consistent with the Likert scale. We focus on this general happiness score in
our empirical analysis. It will perhaps be useful to check internal consistency
and test-retest reliability of this measure within our sample. To test internal
consistency, we calculate the Cronbach’s alpha, which is 0.88 for the general
happiness measure and between 0.85-0.89 for each of the twelve items listed
above. This suggests that the GHQ measures we use are internally consis-
tent. The test-retest reliability scores—which we calculate both through the
canonical correlation coefficient and intra-class correlation coefficient based on
a mixed-effects linear model—range in the interval 0.52-0.75, which means that
the GHQ measure has a reasonably reliable correlation between the test and
retest for an annual survey. All the coefficient are significant at 1 percent level.
For the individual- and job-related characteristics, we follow the recent studies
using the BHPS and control for gender, age, age-squared, education levels,
preferences over working hours, types of contract, size of establishment, pro-
motion opportunities, union membership, and health status [Taylor (2006)].
We collapse the education-levels into seven broad groups as follows: higher de-
gree refers to postgraduate education, first degree refers to college education,
‘A’-level, ‘O’-level and other higher qualification refer to high school gradu-
ates of different types (consistent with the UK education system), vocational
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qualification refers to teaching, nursing, commercial, apprenticeship, and the
certificate of secondary education (CSE), and, finally, the ones with no qual-
ification. We also construct a dummy variable (“Income”) for earnings. It is
equal to 1 if the worker earns more than the median level of earnings in her
reference group (in the corresponding wave) and it is equal to 0 otherwise.
The reference groups are simply the region-industry combinations, in which
the individuals can potentially interact [see Tumen and Zeydanli (2014) for
more details on the construction of the reference groups]. We construct such
a variable to control for the income-comparison.
Table (3.1) presents the summary statistics of the data that we use in our
analysis. In order to be included into our sample, the respondent must be
employed and have reported an overall job satisfaction score or a general hap-
piness score. The mean age of the respondents is around 39. Among the 69,000
observations, 50% are male, 56% are married, 33% are never married, 2.9%
have higher degree, 12.3% have first degree, another 13.2% have ‘A’-level de-
gree, 21.2% have ‘O’-level degree, 26.2% have other higher qualifications, 11.6%
have vocational qualifications, and the remaining 12.7% have no qualifications.
2.9% and 1.7% have temporary and fixed term contracts, respectively. 17%
work in the public sector and 69.1% work in a company of size 200 workers or
smaller. 23.9% are union members. 8% prefer to work more hours and 31.4%
prefer to work fewer hours. 25% report their health to be very good, whereas
15.9% report to be satisfactory. 52.4% earn above the median monthly income
in their respective reference groups. The mean overall job satisfaction rate is
5.38 out of 7, with a standard deviation of 1.296. The mean general happiness
score is 22.75 out of 48, with a standard deviation of 5.073. Notice that there
are two dummy variables in the table labeled Fri/Sat and Sun/Mon. Fri/Sat
is equal to 1 if the interview is conducted on a Friday or Saturday and 0 oth-
erwise. Sun/Mon is equal to 1 if the interview is conducted on a Sunday or
Monday and 0 otherwise. 18.9% of the workers in our sample are interviewed
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on Friday or Saturday, while 24.7% on Sunday or Monday. All the means and
the standard deviations reported in Table (3.1) are calculated using the BHPS
frequency weights.
3.3 Econometric Framework
The econometric framework we use is a standard random-utility specification
in combination with a version of the two-sector Roy model [Roy (1951)].4
Suppose that the survey respondents can choose whether to respond in some
certain days of the week (D = 1) versus the remaining days (D = 0). For our
job satisfaction analysis, D = 1 refers to responding the survey on a Friday or
Saturday and D = 0 refers to responding on the remaining days of the week.
Similarly, for happiness, D = 1 refers to responding the survey on a Sunday
or Monday and D = 0 refers to responding on the remaining days of the week.
For expositional simplicity, we will mention only D = 1 or D = 0 without a
further reference to the days associated with these choices.
Following the conventional random utility analysis embedded into the binary
discrete-choice setup, the equations motivating the individual’s choice of D = 1
versus D = 0 can be written as follows:
U0 = Zα
′
0 + ν0, (3.1)
U1 = Zα
′
1 + ν1, (3.2)
where Z is a row-vector of observed covariates. This is the standard additive
random utility specification, where α′0 and α
′
1 are the deterministic compo-
nents, and ν0 and ν1 are the random components.
4See also Heckman and Honore (1990).
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To rationalize the individual’s choice of D, we presume an index function
I = U1 − U0, (3.3)
which can be rewritten, after plugging in the random utility equations, as
I = Zγ ′ + η, (3.4)
where γ = α1 − α0 and η = ν1 − ν0. The key consideration is that the
econometrician observes the subjective (or self-reported) well-being response
Y1 if I ≥ 0 and he observes Y0 if I < 0. The intuition is as follows. For
a moment, let’s consider the job satisfaction example. The interviewee takes
the interview on a Friday or Saturday (D = 1) rather than the other days if
she receives higher utility from doing so. This higher utility (i.e., U1 > U0) is
translated into the expression I ≥ 0. As a result, Y1 is observed. The utilities
are not observed; but, what the econometrician observes are a choice and an
associated well-being outcome. The observed subjective well-being outcome,
in this setup, is
Y = (1−D)Y0 +DY1, (3.5)
which means that Y = Y0 if D = 0 and Y = Y1 if D = 1. Y1 is observed when
U1 ≥ U0 and Y0 is observed otherwise. The main lesson that this formulation
communicates is the following. The day of the week on which the interviewee
takes the interview is a matter of choice. There are both observed and unob-
served factors that may be affecting this choice. Accounting for unobservables
may change the results reported in the literature. This formulation aims at
explicitly controlling for unobserved determinants of the day of the week.
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To map this formulation to data, we formulate two outcome equations:
Y0 = Xβ
′
0 + ε0, (3.6)
Y1 = Xβ
′
1 + ε1, (3.7)
where X is a row-vector of observed covariates. We assume that (X,Z) ⊥⊥
(η, ε1, ε0), where ⊥⊥ denotes statistical independence. We also assume that the
error terms are jointly normally distributed as (η, ε1, ε0) ∼ N (0,Σ), where Σ







Note that from η = ε1 − ε0, it is easy to show that σηη = σ11 + σ00 − 2σ10,
ση1 = σ11 − σ10, and ση0 = σ10 − σ00.
As we explain above, D = 1(I ≥ 0), where 1 stands for an indicator function.
From data on Y , D, and (X,Z), the following quantities can be obtained:
P[D = 1|Z], E[Y |D = 1,X,Z], and E[Y |D = 0,X,Z].
One key issue is the distinction between Z and X. For identification purposes,
we assume that these two data vectors overlap except one extra variable in
Z; that is, dim(Z) = dim(X) + 1, where the notation “dim” describes the
dimension of a data vector. In other words, we need an extra variable that
affects the choice of the agent, but does not affect the outcome of interest. This
is known in the literature as an “exclusion restriction” (or an instrument) that
secures identification in selection-correction models. See Section 3.3.3 for a
comprehensive discussion of this issue as well as the details of the specific
exclusion restriction that we use in this paper.
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3.3.1 Selection Correction
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This probit equation identifies γ/ση, where ση =
√
σηη. Now we consider the
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and the second outcome equation gives
E[Y |D = 0,X = x,Z = z] = E[Y0|X = x,Z = z]










where λ(·) is the inverse Mills ratio and, as a general rule, λ(c) = φ(c)/Φ(−c).
From the probit regression in (3.9), we already know the parameter γ/ση.










. Equations (3.10) and (3.11)












to identify β0, β1, ση0/ση, and ση1/ση.
5
3.3.2 Treatment Effects
In our context, “treatment” refers to taking the interview on a Friday or Satur-
day for job satisfaction analysis and Sunday or Monday for happiness analysis
(i.e., D = 1). Obtaining the treatment effect estimates would be useful for
our analysis, since it will enhance our understanding of the existence, extent,
and the sources of the selection structure. Calculation of the treatment effects
are simple and straightforward after obtaining the bias corrected estimates
described in the previous subsection. The most commonly sought treatment
effect parameter is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). It can simply be
formulated as
ATE(x) = E[Y1 − Y0|X = x]
= x(β′1 − β′0). (3.12)
This can be interpreted as the effect of randomly assigning D = 1 to everyone
withX = x. The main problem with this parameter is analogous to the central
question that we address in this paper; that is, it may not reflect a true causal
effect of D = 1 versus D = 0 on the subjects, because the ones who choose
D = 1 maybe systematically different from the ones who choose D = 0.6 This
difference leads the evaluation of the outcome at the counterfactual states to
be biased.
The other two treatment effect parameters that we calculate in this study
are the treatment on the treated (TT) and the treatment on the untreated
5Identification of the other parameters is also possible. But, in this paper, we are not
interested in the magnitudes of the rest of the parameters. See Heckman and Honore (1990)
for the details. See also Heckman and Robb (1985) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b).
6Remember that in our case D = 1 refers to taking the interview on a Friday or Saturday
versus the remaining days for the job satisfaction analysis and on a Sunday or Monday
versus the remaining days for the happiness analysis.
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(TUT). These parameters can nicely be formulated as a function of the con-
trol functions estimated during the implementation of the selection-correction
procedure [see Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) for details]. The parameter
TT can be formulated as
TT(x, pz) = E[Y1 − Y0|D = 1,X = x,Z = z]






while TUT can be formulated as
TUT(x, pz) = E[Y1 − Y0|D = 0,X = x,Z = z]






where pz refers to the propensity score estimated in the first stage probit re-
gression. The average TT is the average gain for those who sort into treatment
compared to what the average person would gain. It oversamples the unob-
served characteristics that lead to selectivity for those individuals who are more
likely to choose D = 1. In other words, it calculates the net effect between
those who actually participate and those who do not, as if they had given the
chance to revert their choice of D = 0 into D = 1. A symmetric definition can
be provided for TUT, oversamples the unobserved characteristics that lead to
selectivity for those individuals who are less likely to choose D = 1.
For the purposes of this paper, we are interested in the “averages” of these
three treatment effect parameters. In other words, the estimates reported at
the end of the paper are the parameter estimates integrated over the entire
horizon of x and z in our sample. It is also possible to report the distribution
of these treatment effects over the sample space. But, we report only the
means to keep the paper as compact as possible.
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Notice that when the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio calculated at the
second stage is zero, then the TT and TUT collapses into ATE. This is the
case with no selectivity. When there is positive sorting into the treatment
state (as in our case), on the other hand, the econometrician would find TT >
ATE > TUT. Moreover, it is easy to verify that ATE = p × TT + (1 − p) ×
TUT. In Section 3.4, we use these formulas and calculate the treatment effect
parameters for both the job satisfaction and happiness scores.
3.3.3 The Exclusion Restriction
There are two traditional ways through which the Heckman selection-correction
method can be applied. The first one is the existence of an additional variable
in the selection equation, which does not affect the outcome of interest. This
is called the “exclusion restriction” (or “instrument”) and it secures identifi-
cation of bias-corrected estimates. The second one is to use the nonlinearity
inherent in the inverse Mills ratio. In this case, identification solely comes
from the normality assumption. The latter is disadvantageous for two reasons;
(i) self-selection may not be originating from a normally distributed process
[Little and Rubin (1987)] and (ii) the inverse Mills ratio may still be highly
collinear with the other regressors in the outcome equation [Leung and Yu
(1996)]. A potential disadvantage of the exclusion restriction approach is that
there is no natural guide to specify a variable that affects the choice but does
not affect the outcome; moreover, a wrongful implementation of the restric-
tion may be harmful [Manning, Duan, and Rogers (1987)]. Nevertheless, the
main consensus is that, using an appropriate exclusion restriction, if there ex-
ists one, will secure a more convincing identification of the selection-corrected
estimates. Fortunately, the BHPS dataset allows us to construct a sensible
exclusion restriction for our analysis.
We use the interviewer ID as an exclusion restriction. More precisely, we rely
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on the identifying assumption that who the interviewer is a determinant of
when the interviewee takes the survey, but it is not a determinant of the sur-
vey outcome (i.e., happiness and job satisfaction). Figures (3.1) and (3.2) plot
the tendencies of the interviewers in terms of timing. To be concrete, Figure
(3.1) presents the distribution of the interviewers’ probabilities of conducting
the survey on a Friday or Saturday. Similarly, Figure (3.1) describes the distri-
bution of the interviewers’ probabilities of conducting the survey on a Sunday
or Monday. For example, a value of 0.4 read on the horizontal axis should
be interpreted as a 40% of the interviews conducted by that particular inter-
viewer are on a Friday or Saturday. Clearly, some interviewers are more likely
to conduct the interview of certain days.
The validity of this exclusion restriction is justified in the empirical analysis
presented by Taylor (2006). He shows that the interviewer ID likely affects
the day on which the interview is conducted; but, it does not affect the out-
come (i.e., the subjective well-being score). We follow this suggestion and use
interviewer ID as an exclusion restriction in our selection-correction exercise.
To construct the variable that we use as the exclusion restriction, we determine
the mean values in these two distributions. We generate a binary variable
taking the value 1 if the interviewer’s probability is greater than the mean and
0 otherwise. This new dummy variable characterizes if the interviewer is more
likely to conduct the interview on a Friday or Saturday (Sunday or Monday)
than the average tendency in the job satisfaction (happiness) analysis. The
mean tendency to conduct the interview on a Friday or Saturday is 0.189 for
job satisfaction and the corresponding mean tendency to conduct the interview
on a Sunday or Monday for happiness is around 0.24. Table (3.5) documents
that this binary variable (i.e., interviewer dummy) is a relevant determinant
of the day of interview. Intuitively, who the interviewer is should not be a
systematic determinant of well-being. As a result, we use this dummy variable
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as an exclusion restriction in our selection-correction exercise.
3.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, we document the empirical results and provide an extensive
discussion of the main implications of our analysis. We start with a simple
observation. Fridays and Saturdays are the days on which the self-reported
job satisfaction scores are higher, on average, than the scores reported on the
other days. Moreover, Sundays and Mondays are the days on which the self-
reported happiness scores are lower, on average, than the scores reported on
the remaining days of the week. These raw patterns are best observed from
the results of an OLS regression of the associated well-being score on the day
dummies. Tables (3.2) and (3.3) document these patterns.
The second step is to see whether including observed characteristics into these
regressions changes these results or not. We include a comprehensive set of
regressors for both worker- and job-related characteristics. The worker-related
regressors include age as a quadratic polynomial and dummy variables for
gender, marital status, education, health, region, and the year of interview.
The job-related regressors include dummy variables for job contractual status,
permanency of job, promotion opportunities, union membership status, pub-
lic/private sector job, firm size, preference for work hours, relative income, and
industry.7 We perform two separate regressions for job satisfaction and happi-
ness controlling for these variables as well as the day-of-the-week dummies. We
find that the results of the simple regressions described above are reinstated;
that is, on average, job satisfaction scores are higher for those interviewed
on Fridays or Saturdays and happiness scores are lower for those interviewed
on Sundays or Mondays. These results are in line with the day-of-the-week
7Table (3.1) presents the basic summary statistics for these variables as well as the
outcome variables.
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patterns documented by the main papers in the related literature.8 See Table
(3.4) for the results.
We investigate if there is any sorting on unobservables that can potentially bias
these day of the week patterns. If self-selection is in effect, then individuals
with certain unobserved characteristics tend to respond the survey on certian
days of the week. For example, those who respond the survey on a Friday or
Saturday may be the ones who are the most satisfied with their jobs. These
individuals may have a strong motivation to work hard during the week and
the only available time for them to respond may be a Friday afternoon or a
Saturday. In this example, “motivation” is the unobserved variable. There
may also be other unobserved factors which are also relevant for this example.
For happiness, those who respond the survey on a Sunday or Monday may be
the ones who are the most unhappy ones with their jobs or lives in general
due to some unobserved factors. These individuals may be, say, the least
conscientious9 ones, therefore they are the ones who are more likely to express
their unhappiness at the end of a weekend vacation or at the beginning of a
busy week. One can easily extend these examples.
If selection is a concern, then the differences in days, in terms of subjective
well-being outcomes, may be driven by these unobserved individual-level het-
erogeneity components. In other words, the day of the week patterns can be
explained by non-random sorting on unobservables if self-selection is strong.
To test this hypothesis, we perform a simple selection-correction procedure
motivated by a combination of the Roy model with a standard random utility
specification described in Section 3.3. As we discuss in Section 3.3.3, the inter-
viewer ID is used to construct an exclusion restriction to secure identification.
8See, for example, Taylor (2006), Akay and Martinsson (2009), and Helliwell and Wang
(2013).
9Conscientiousness is one of the big-five personality traits that constitute an individ-
ual’s non-cognitive skills. See Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel (2008) for an
extensive description of these concepts.
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Table (3.5) documents the results our first-stage probit estimations. Tables
(3.6) and (3.7) report the second-stage regressions, in which we use the inverse
Mills ratios constructed from the first-stage as regressors.
Our results reveal that selectivity is very strong; that is, individuals sort into
the days of the week based on their unobserved characteristics that affect the
outcomes. Back of the envelope calculations (i.e., averaging the inverse Mills
ratio and multiplying this average with the estimated coefficient) yield the
result that almost all of the difference between Friday/Saturday (D = 1) and
the remaining days (D = 0) disappear after controlling for selectivity. Similar
calculations show that, after controlling for selectivity, Sunday and Monday
(D = 1) are actually happier days than the other days of the week (D = 0).
We perform a further investigation of these selectivity patterns using the treat-
ment effect parameters described in Section 3.3.2. Tables (3.8), (3.9), (3.10)
and Figures (3.3), (3.4) document these estimates. The existence of selectivity
is confirmed from the result that TT > ATE > TUT. The treatment on the
treated parameter is quite high, strongly supporting the “non-random sorting
on unobservables” idea.
We further show that, for job satisfaction, the estimated treatment effects are
higher among males, non-married workers, workers with permanent jobs, pub-
lic sector workers, workers in large firms, union members, workers with good
health, workers who prefer to work less, workers with higher relative income,
workers with higher education, and middle-aged workers. These patterns are
important, because the existence of significant selectivity signals that the OLS
estimates of the coefficients of other observed covariates are biased. There is
a consensus in the empirical job satisfaction literature using BHPS—see, e.g.,
Taylor (2006)—that, on average, females, married workers, and workers with
low education levels are more satisfied with their jobs. Our estimates show
that these results are biased. For example, married workers are known to be
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more satisfied jobwise. Our raw OLS estimates reported in Table (3.4) reads a
coefficient of 0.066 for marriage. The selection corrected estimates yield coeffi-
cients of 0.025 for the D = 1 sector and 0.075 for the D = 0 sector. In terms of
our results, this suggests that workers whose unobserved characteristics lead
to relatively lower job satisfaction (D = 0) tend to be married and this gen-
erates a higher coefficient in the D = 0 group versus a much lower coefficient
in the D = 1 group. The signs of the coefficients have not changed after cor-
recting for selection, but the magnitudes have become much weaker. Another
example is for the job satisfaction patterns across age groups [see Figures (3.3)
and (3.4)]. The literature reports that—see, e.g., Clark, Oswald, and Warr
(1996)—there is a U -shaped relationship between job satisfaction and age.10
Our findings reveal that the selection bias takes an inverse U -shape over the
life course; therefore, the observed U -shaped relationship between well-being
and age is likely biased, too. All these patterns are also observed for happiness
along similar lines.
The main practical implication of this study is that the observed day-of-the-
week effects are mostly due to compositional shifts rather than behavioral
changes. We show that the compositional effects are driven by heterogeneity
in unobserved factors that diffuse into individuals’ choice of the interview date.
This result does not mean that psychological factors have no effect on well-
being. It rather suggests that the observed day-of-the-week patterns should
not be interpreted as direct evidence of the link between “mood” and well-
being. Uncovering the details of the unobserved factors driving compositional
shifts is an interesting topic for future research, but it is out of the scope of
this paper.
We conduct our analysis with the BHPS, which is a representative dataset for
the United Kingdom. This means that both the observed day-of-the-week pat-
10See, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) for similar findings for happiness.
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terns and the results of the selection-correction exercise should be interpreted
taking the British cultural norms as the benchmark. Depending on the country,
norms, and even religious beliefs, the observed day- of-the-week patterns may
change. For example, Monday is a major “blue” day in the United Kingdom,
while Sunday is shown to be “blue” in Germany [Akay and Martinsson (2009)].
In North America, on the other hand, Sunday is often reported as a happy day
[Helliwell and Wang (2013)]. The results may change further in, say, Muslim
or Jewish societies. Although the observed day-of-the-week patterns tend to
change across cultures, we believe that our analysis has broader implications
that can be relevant for other countries, regions, and cultures. In some sense,
our results imply that the cross-cultural differences in the observed day-of-the-
week patterns will tend to disappear after correcting for selectivity. But, it
may well the case that the unobserved characteristics that lead to selectivity
can also be based on cultural differences, social norms, differences in work-
ing hours, worker motivation, expectations, etc. Further empirical research is
needed to test the validity of these cross-cultural concerns.
The BHPS is not the only dataset on which our procedures can be imple-
mented. The same empirical exercise can be performed for other countries,
where micro-level subjective well-being datasets are available with proper “date
of interview” information. For example, a similar analysis may also be con-
ducted using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) dataset. Another
dataset that can be used is the Gallup/Healthways U.S. daily poll. However,
the same analysis cannot be carried out with datasets like World Values Sur-
vey, Euro-barometer, and International Social Survey Programme, because the
date of interview is mostly missing in these datasets.
A potential limitation of our analysis is related to the instrument we use in
the selection-correction exercise. The instrument—or the exclusion restric-
tion—has to be correlated with the choice of the interview day, but it has
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to be uncorrelated with the outcome, i.e., the subjective well-being score. In
other words, the instrument has to be placed into the choice equation, but ex-
cluded from the outcome equation to guarantee identification. To satisfy these
requirements, we use the interviewer ID number as our exclusion restriction.
We argue that who the interviewer is can affect the interview day, because
some interviewers may be more likely to work at weekends than the others.
However, we also argue that the interviewer ID has very little or no effect on
the interviewee’s responses. The limitation may apply at this point: if the
interviewee’s response is systematically affected by the interviewer ID, then
this logic would not work. We perform several robustness checks to question
the relevance of this concern. We find that some interviewers are indeed much
more inclined to conduct interviews at weekends than the others. We also
find that the interviewer dummies are mostly insignificant in the regression of
the well-being score on all the explanatory variables and the interviewer ID’s.
This provides suggestive evidence that the interviewer ID might be a valid
instrument.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate whether the day-of-the-week effect estimates re-
ported in the empirical subjective well-being literature suffer from selectivity
bias. We use the BHPS dataset to answer this question. Our answer is yes;
that is, we show that the observed day-of-the-week patterns is a by product
of non-random sorting of individuals into the days of the week. More pre-
cisely, we show that individuals who take the BHPS interview on a Friday
or Saturday—the days on which the self-reported job satisfaction score is the
highest—are selectively different in terms of their unobserved characteristics
from the ones interviewed on the remaining days. Similarly, the individuals
who take the BHPS interview on a Sunday or Monday—the days on which the
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self-reported happiness score is the lowest—are selectively different in terms
of their unobserved characteristics from the ones interviewed on the remaining
days. We conclude that the argument supporting the existence of weekly cycles
in individual utility is not as strong as the literature suggests. We also discuss
the potential channels through which the self-selection process operates.
The previous literature argues that, everything else constant, the individual
well-being is lower in certain days of the week than the remaining days. This
is generally interpreted as an evidence supporting the view that individuals
assess their well-being at any given moment over time. Subjective well-being
measures are often used to proxy individual-level utility (or preferences), which
is the main building block of the theory of economic decisions. Thus, if well-
being is an “objective” motivating economic choices, then the decisions made
on Sundays would be different than those made on, say, Wednesdays. This
implies that behavioral changes can mostly be attributed to psychological fac-
tors. However, this is strictly against the neoclassical economic theory, which
is built on the basic idea that preferences should not change often (i.e., they
are stable). Our findings provide evidence that the existence of weekly cycles
in individual well-being may not be as relevant as the literature documents.
Our results reveal that interpreting the observed day-to-day differences in the
average subjective well-being scores as mood fluctuations might be incorrect.
We do not say that preferences are not affected by psychological motives. We
say that ruling out the neoclassical economic theory based on the uncorrected
day-of-the-week patterns might produce misleading results.
We provide an alternative explanation for the observed day-of-the-week pat-
terns in subjective well-being scores: the composition of survey respondents in
terms of their unobserved characteristics changes across the days of the week
on a non-random basis. We argue that these compositional shifts have a po-
tential to be falsely interpreted as mood fluctuations. That said, we do not
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totally rule out the state-dependent nature of utility. Utility may be chang-
ing across states if these states reflect some fundamental feature of individual
utility; such as employment status, marital status, etc. We rather argue that
day-to-day shifts in agents’ valuation of economic objects do not have strong
empirical basis, when selectivity is controlled for.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics—BHPS (1992-2009)
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Job satisfaction 5.383 1.296 1 7
Happiness 22.748 5.073 12 48
Male 0.497 0.500 0 1
Age 38.749 12.900 16 85
Married 0.563 0.496 0 1
Never married 0.328 0.470 0 1
Higher degree 0.029 0.168 0 1
First degree 0.123 0.328 0 1
‘A’-levels 0.132 0.339 0 1
‘O’-levels 0.212 0.409 0 1
Other higher qual. 0.262 0.440 0 1
Vocational qual. 0.116 0.320 0 1
No degree 0.127 0.332 0 1
Temporary worker 0.029 0.167 0 1
Fixed-term contract 0.017 0.129 0 1
Public sector worker 0.170 0.376 0 1
Small employer 0.691 0.462 0 1
Promotion opp. 0.405 0.491 0 1
Union member 0.239 0.426 0 1
Health very good 0.250 0.433 0 1
Health very satisfactory 0.159 0.366 0 1
Prefers to work more 0.080 0.271 0 1
Prefers to work less 0.314 0.464 0 1
Income 0.524 0.499 0 1
Fri/Sat 0.189 0.392 0 1
Sun/Mon 0.247 0.431 0 1
Notes: This table roughly summarizes the data we use. We focus on
employed individuals in the BHPS data covering the period 1992–2009.
Appropriate sampling weights are used.
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Table 3.2: Day orderings
Dependent variable Job Satisfaction Happiness
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error)
Friday 0.0340*** (0.0020) -0.0405*** (0.0076)
Saturday 0.0221*** (0.0022) -0.0208** (0.0086)
Sunday -0.0041 (0.0027) 0.0709*** (0.0106)
Monday 0.0032** (0.0017) 0.1008*** (0.0066)
Tuesday 0.0191*** (0.0017) 0.0683*** (0.0065)
Wednesday -0.0072*** (0.0017) -0.0095 (0.0065)
Thursday Omitted Omitted
Constant 5.367*** (0.0012) 22.719*** (0.0048)
# of observations 68,773 68,504
Notes: This table presents the results of an OLS regression of the subjective
well-being score on the days of the week. Thursday is the omitted dummy
variable; that is, the results should be read with respect to Thursday. For job
satisfaction, the raw ordering of the days are as Friday, Saturday, Tuesday,
Monday, Thursday, Sunday, and Wednesday, from the most satisfied to the
least satisfied day. For happiness, the raw ordering of the days are as Friday,
Saturday, Wednesday, Thursday, Tuesday, Sunday, and Monday, from the
best to the worst day. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
levels, respectively. Appropriate sampling weights are used. Robust standard
errors are reported.
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Table 3.3: Bunching the days
Dependent variable Job Satisfaction Happiness
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error)
Fri/Sat 0.0255*** (0.0013) - -
Sun/Mon - - 0.0879*** (0.0047)
Constant 5.371*** (0.0006) 22.726*** (0.0023)
# of observations 68,773 68,504
Notes: This table repeats the exercise above by regressing the job satisfaction
(happiness) score on the Fri/Sat (Sun/Mon) dummy. The Fri/Sat
(Sun/Mon) dummy indicates if the interview is conducted on a Friday or
Saturday (Sunday or Monday). Individuals interviewed on a Friday or
Saturday report, on average, higher job satisfaction scores than the ones
interviewed on the remaining days. Similarly, Individuals interviewed on a
Sunday or Monday report, on average, lower happiness scores than the ones
interviewed on the remaining days. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively. Appropriate sampling weights are used.
Robust standard errors are reported.
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Fri/Sat interview
Notes: This figure presents the distributional features of the interviewer ID
variable that we use at the probit regression for job satisfaction score. The
horizontal axis describes the probability for a specific interviewer to conduct
the interview on a Friday or Saturday. For example, a value of 0.4 for
interviewer j means that the interviewer j conducted 40% of his/her
interviews on a Friday or Saturday.
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Sun/Mon interview
Notes: This figure presents the distributional features of the interviewer ID
variable that we use at the probit regression for the general happiness score.
The horizontal axis describes the probability for a specific interviewer to
conduct the interview on a Sunday or Monday. For example, a value of 0.4
for interviewer j means that the interviewer j conducted 40% of his/her
interviews on a Sunday or Monday.
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Table 3.4: Day patterns conditional on observed variation.
Dependent var. Job Satisfaction Happiness
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error)
Fri/Sat 0.032*** (0.0012) - -
Sun/Mon - - 0.097*** (0.0045)
Male -0.241*** (0.0011) -1.178*** (0.0044)
Age -0.038*** (0.0003) 0.205*** (0.0010)
Age2/100 0.052*** (0.0003) -0.243*** (0.0012)
Married 0.066*** (0.0016) -0.660*** (0.0072)
Never married -0.141*** (0.0020) -0.511*** (0.0088)
Higher degree -0.133*** (0.0031) 0.354*** (0.0135)
First degree -0.242*** (0.0022) 0.323*** (0.0086)
‘A’-levels -0.189*** (0.0021) 0.109*** (0.0079)
‘O’-levels -0.088*** (0.0019) -0.021*** (0.0069)
Other higher qual. -0.139*** (0.0019) 0.129*** (0.0070)
Vocational qual. -0.073*** (0.0021) -0.111*** (0.0078)
Temporary worker -0.125*** (0.0042) -0.026** (0.0122)
Fixed-term contract -0.052*** (0.0044) -0.283*** (0.0163)
Public sector worker -0.001 (0.0015) -0.012* (0.0062)
Small employer 0.149*** (0.0011) -0.010** (0.0043)
Promotion opp. 0.319*** (0.0011) -0.577*** (0.0044)
Union member -0.188*** (0.0013) 0.339*** (0.0052)
Health very good 0.225*** (0.0011) -1.665*** (0.0043)
Health very satisfactory -0.166*** (0.0015) 1.387*** (0.0060)
Prefers to work more -0.241*** (0.0021) 0.685*** (0.0080)
Prefers to work less -0.518*** (0.0011) 0.831*** (0.0044)
Income 0.063*** (0.0013) -0.170*** (0.0049)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Constant 6.21*** (0.0098) 20.162*** (0.0378)
# of observations 68,773 68,504
R2 0.0921 0.0813
Notes: This table repeats the exercise in Table (3.3) by controlling for a
comprehensive set of observed worker- and job-related characteristics. The
results suggest that the day patterns are even stronger when observed
variation is controlled for. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively. Appropriate sampling weights are used.
Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table 3.5: Probit regression.
Dependent var. Fri/Sat Sun/Mon
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error)
Male 0.029*** (0.0013) 0.009*** (0.0012)
Age 0.017*** (0.0003) 0.002*** (0.0003)
Age2/100 -0.019*** (0.0004) -0.002*** (0.0003)
Married -0.045*** (0.0019) 0.008*** (0.0018)
Never married -0.032*** (0.0023) 0.034*** (0.0023)
Higher degree 0.154*** (0.0038) 0.061*** (0.0036)
First degree 0.112*** (0.0026) 0.040*** (0.0024)
‘A’-levels 0.062*** (0.0025) -0.003 (0.0023)
‘O’-levels 0.060*** (0.0022) 0.029*** (0.0020)
Other higher qual. 0.057*** (0.0022) 0.011*** (0.0020)
Vocational qual. 0.050*** (0.0024) 0.025*** (0.0022)
Temporary worker 0.042*** (0.0044) -0.050*** (0.0034)
Fixed-term contract -0.010** (0.0049) -0.088*** (0.0044)
Public sector worker 0.004** (0.0018) -0.039*** (0.0017)
Small employer 0.004*** (0.0013) 0.007*** (0.0012)
Promotion opp. 0.017*** (0.0013) 0.002 (0.0012)
Union member 0.015*** (0.0015) -0.019*** (0.0015)
Health very good 0.003* (0.0014) 0.012*** (0.0013)
Health very satisfactory -0.013*** (0.0016) 0.026*** (0.0016)
Prefers to work more -0.027*** (0.0023) 0.018*** (0.0021)
Prefers to work less -0.007*** (0.0013) 0.006*** (0.0012)
Income 0.011*** (0.0015) 0.019*** (0.0014)
Interviewer dummy 0.524*** (0.0004) 0.410*** (0.0011)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Constant -1.482*** (0.0118) -0.904*** (0.0104)
# of observations 68,773 68,504
Pseudo R2 0.0380 0.0215
Notes: This table documents the results of the probit regression of the day
selection of the interviewee on a set of observed characteristics and the
interviewer dummy. This is the first step of the usual Heckman two-step
selection correction procedure. The interviewer dummy takes the value 1 if
the interviewer is more likely to conduct the interview—than the average
tendency—on a Friday or Saturday (Sunday or Monday) in the job
satisfaction (happiness) analysis. It affects the interviewee’s choice of the
interview day, but it does not affect the outcome. Thus, it can serve as an
exclusion restriction in the selection correction analysis. *, **, *** indicate
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appropriate sampling
weights are used. Robust standard errors are reported.
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Table 3.6: Second step (job satisfaction)
Dependent variable: Job Satisfaction
(Y1) (Y0)
Fri/Sat=1 Fri/Sat=0
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error)
Male -0.204*** (0.0026) -0.248*** (0.0013)
Age -0.029*** (0.0007) -0.038*** (0.0003)
Age2/100 0.041*** (0.0008) 0.053*** (0.0003)
Married 0.025*** (0.0036) 0.075*** (0.0018)
Never married -0.150*** (0.0044) -0.141*** (0.0023)
Higher degree -0.076*** (0.0070) -0.144*** (0.0035)
First degree -0.241*** (0.0050) -0.239*** (0.0025)
‘A’-levels -0.173*** (0.0050) -0.189*** (0.0023)
‘O’-levels -0.095*** (0.0044) -0.083*** (0.0021)
Other higher qual. -0.171*** (0.0044) -0.129*** (0.0020)
Vocational qual. -0.093*** (0.0049) -0.067*** (0.0023)
Temporary worker -0.196*** (0.0099) -0.107*** (0.0046)
Fixed-term contract -0.011 (0.0099) -0.061*** (0.0049)
Public sector worker 0.014*** (0.0034) -0.005*** (0.0016)
Small employer 0.122*** (0.0025) 0.156*** (0.0012)
Promotion opp. 0.340*** (0.0025) 0.313*** (0.0012)
Union member -0.167*** (0.0030) -0.193*** (0.0014)
Health very good 0.244*** (0.0026) 0.219*** (0.0013)
Health very satisfactory -0.161*** (0.0033) -0.168*** (0.0016)
Prefers to work more -0.286*** (0.0049) -0.229*** (0.0023)
Prefers to work less -0.494*** (0.0026) -0.524*** (0.0013)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0415*** (0.0059) -0.0797*** (0.0054)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Constant 6.192*** (0.0258) 6.240*** (0.0107)
# of observations 12,901 55,872
R2 0.0845 0.0951
Notes: This table presents the results of the second step OLS regression of
the job satisfaction score on a set of observed covariates (excluding the
interviewer dummy) and the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the results of
the first step probit regression, which are given in Table (3.5). Clearly, the
inverse Mills ratios indicate a significant positive-selection into the treatment
sector. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels,
respectively. Appropriate sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors
are reported.
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Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Coefficient (Standard Error)
Male -1.178*** (0.0089) -1.173*** (0.0051)
Age 0.217*** (0.0020) 0.201*** (0.0012)
Age2/100 -0.261*** (0.0024) -0.237*** (0.0013)
Married -0.708*** (0.0148) -0.641*** (0.0082)
Never married -0.546*** (0.0180) -0.490*** (0.0101)
Higher degree 0.766*** (0.0274) 0.222*** (0.0155)
First degree 0.318*** (0.0177) 0.336*** (0.0098)
‘A’-levels 0.091*** (0.0162) 0.113*** (0.0090)
‘O’-levels 0.004 (0.0145) -0.025*** (0.0079)
Other higher qual. 0.039*** (0.0145) 0.164*** (0.0080)
Vocational qual. -0.264*** (0.0161) -0.054*** (0.0089)
Temporary worker -0.258*** (0.0241) -0.218*** (0.0186)
Fixed-term contract -0.524*** (0.0340) -0.061*** (0.0049)
Public sector worker 0.149*** (0.0130) -0.072*** (0.0070)
Small employer 0.081*** (0.0088) -0.039*** (0.0050)
Promotion opp. -0.519*** (0.0090) -0.593*** (0.0050)
Union member 0.400*** (0.0106) 0.317*** (0.0059)
Health very good -1.665*** (0.0088) -1.664*** (0.0050)
Health very satisfactory 1.474*** (0.0122) 1.361*** (0.0069)
Prefers to work more 0.472*** (0.0166) 0.756*** (0.0091)
Prefers to work less 0.723*** (0.0088) 0.870*** (0.0050)
Income -0.271*** (0.0099) -0.137*** (0.0056)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.102*** (0.0260) -0.549*** (0.0240)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Constant 20.378*** (0.0782) 20.458*** (0.0461)
# of observations 16,972 51,532
R2 0.0851 0.0812
Notes: This table presents the results of the second step OLS regression of
the general happiness score on a set of observed covariates (excluding the
interviewer dummy) and the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the results of
the first step probit regression, which are given in Table (3.5). Clearly, the
inverse Mills ratios indicate a significant positive-selection into the treatment
sector. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels,
respectively. Appropriate sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors
are reported.
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Notes: This table documents the treatment effects estimates for job
satisfaction and happiness. ATE refers to the Average Treatment Effect, TT
refers to the (average) Treatment on the Treated, and TUT refers to the
(average) Treatment on the Untreated. Appropriate sampling weights are
used.
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Table 3.9: Estimated treatment effects for education categories






























Notes: This table documents the treatment effect estimates for job
satisfaction and happiness in different education categories. Appropriate
sampling weights are used.
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Table 3.10: Estimated treatment effects for sub-groups
Treatment Effects for sub-groups
Job Satisfaction Happiness Job Satisfaction Happiness
Male Female
ATE 0.054 0.055 0.012 0.132
TT 0.230 0.894 0.191 0.978
TUT 0.013 -0.220 -0.027 -0.138
Married Non-married
ATE 0.015 0.080 0.058 0.110
TT 0.192 0.925 0.236 0.950
TUT -0.025 -0.190 0.018 -0.164
Permanent Temporary
ATE 0.035 0.101 -0.073 -0.150
TT 0.212 0.942 0.101 0.715
TUT -0.005 -0.172 -0.115 -0.409
Public sector Private sector
ATE 0.067 0.326 0.026 0.046
TT 0.244 1.188 0.203 0.884
TUT 0.026 0.065 -0.014 -0.229
Small employer Large employer
ATE 0.016 0.124 0.071 0.026
TT 0.194 0.965 0.247 0.871
TUT -0.024 -0.149 0.030 -0.244
Union worker Non-union worker
ATE 0.073 0.206 0.020 0.058
TT 0.250 1.056 0.197 0.899
TUT 0.033 -0.062 -0.020 -0.215
Health very good Health satisfactory
ATE 0.059 0.063 0.033 0.162
TT 0.236 0.900 0.212 0.994
TUT 0.018 -0.212 -0.007 -0.117
Prefers to work more Prefers to work less
ATE -0.031 -0.087 0.060 0.005
TT 0.150 0.756 0.237 0.844
TUT -0.069 -0.359 0.019 -0.269
Higher relative income Lower relative income
ATE 0.052 0.058 0.010 0.132
TT 0.226 0.897 0.191 0.979
TUT 0.010 -0.216 -0.029 -0.137
Notes: This table documents the treatment effect estimates for job
satisfaction and happiness in certain sub-groups determined based on worker-
and job-related characteristics. Appropriate sampling weights are used.
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ATE TT TUT
Notes: This figure presents the estimated ATE, TT, and TUT categories for
age groups in the job satisfaction analysis. Ten age categories are used.
Appropriate sampling weights are used.
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Happiness
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Notes: This figure presents the estimated ATE, TT, and TUT categories for
age groups in the happiness analysis. Ten age categories are used.




WELL-BEING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
4.1 Introduction
Ethnic identity is an important determinant of people’s lives in Sub-Saharan
Africa. It affects who they trust, conduct business with, and vote for. More-
over, it can influence individuals regarding their overall well-being. It is often
debated in the literature whether the importance of ethnic identity is driven
by social or political affairs. Some scholars argue that ethnic identification
comes from culture; that is, how people have lived throughout the centuries.
Others argue that it is a political construct; political parties in many African
countries use ethnic identities as a tool to gain access to political power. Us-
ing the Afrobarometer1, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) show that ethnic
identification is more prominent during election periods in comparison to other
identifying categories such as gender, religion, and class/occupation. Ethnic
attachments become even stronger if elections are in a competitive environ-
ment. More specifically, they show that respondents are 1.8 percentage points
more likely to identify ethnically for every month closer the country is to a
1Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in 35 African countries and are repeated on a
regular cycle. It measures social, political, and economic atmosphere of countries. See
Section-4.2 for more information.
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competitive presidential election. This suggests that ethnic identities in Africa
are strengthened by political competition.
Competitive elections can cause considerable violence and widespread destruc-
tion of property, most of which is ethnically motivated. In ethnically diverse
countries, political parties have used ethnic identity to mobilize voters and to
establish political alliances, leading in some cases to violent ethnic conflicts.
For instance, in Kenya, which is an ethnically diverse society, the 2007’s presi-
dential election resulted in the loss of 1,200 lives and the displacement of over
a quarter of a million people. That election was one of the most competitive
in the history of the country. This raises the questions about how competi-
tive elections affect individual subjective well-being2 when they are proximate
and since competitive elections increase the salience of ethnic identification,
how ethnic identification is related to subjective well-being after controlling
for electoral cycle variables.
The first main interest of the paper is to investigate whether individual sub-
jective well-being decreases when competitive elections are approaching. Due
to the intense environment of competitive elections, the general tendency is to
expect to observe a fall in the individual well-being in time the survey is to
an election and further that this decrease is greater in a competitive election
than a landslide election, which leads us to our first hypothesis. As an exercise
under this hypothesis, we elaborate underlying mechanisms of the relationship
that we will explain further in more detail.
The second main interest explored in the paper is the issue of subjective well-
being of the individual and its relationship with the ethnic identification. Since
the salience of ethnic identification is from political competition, this leads to
expect that the higher the identification is, the lower is the individual well-
2Throughout the text, “happiness” and “subjective well-being” are used interchangeably
and refer to an evaluation of one’s own life considered as a whole.
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being, stated as our second hypothesis. In addition, as the literature indicates,
ethnic diversification deteriorates income distribution and creates poverty. In
this respect, communities that are higher in diversification have lower levels of
individual well-being.
These expectations are worth to test because the challenge facing Sub-Saharan
African countries is how to keep the momentum of reforms going and at the
same time improve the well-being of the people in order to avert social and
political instability. Moreover, recent literature suggests that happiness and
life satisfaction are also positively correlated with productivity that will boost
economic growth [Zelenski, Murphy, and Jenkins (2008), Oswald, Proto, and
Sgroi (2014)]. In order to implement policies, one should also take into con-
sideration the factors to which the individual well-being is related.
One factor that some political scientists and economists identify as a cause of
instability and poor economic growth is ethnicity. There is considerable lit-
erature documenting an inverse relationship between social heterogeneity and
economic growth [Easterly and Levine (1997); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005)].3 Easterly and Levine (1997)’s famous “growth tragedy” is primarily
based on the strong link between ethnic heterogeneity and slow growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA).4 However, this study has been criticized for employing
ethnic fractionalization—known as ELF (ethno-linguistic fractionalization)—
as a measure of ethnic diversity. The main criticism pertains the assumption
upon which ELF is built [Posner (2004); Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003); Fearon (2003); Roeder (2004)]. However, there
are several other studies that prove the negative link by using different in-
3A high level of ethnic diversification tends to affect economic growth and development
processes such as trust and transaction costs [Leigh (2006); Knack and Keefer (1997)],
provision of public good [Kimenyi (2006); Fosu, Bates, and Hoeffler (2006)], contact and
contracts [Bates (2000)], and the level of investment [Mauro (1995)].
4They have documented that moving from an ethnically homogeneous country to one
with a diversity of ethnic communities corresponds to a decrease in annual economic growth
rates of more than two percent. These findings have been applied to Africa due to the high
ethnic diversification of these countries.
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dexes. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) utilize the index of polarization
and conclude that polarization increase the probability of conflict. Esteban
and Ray (2011) show that ethnic conflict is a linear combination of ethnic
polarization, ethnic fractionalization, and the Greenberg-Gini index of inter-
group differences. The weights of the linear combination correspond to the
relative importance of public and private goods in the conflict. Specifically,
the impact of polarization increases with conflict over public goods, while the
impact of fractionalization increases with the private component of conflict. In
their following paper, Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) show that a measure
of polarization constructed using linguistic distances is a robust predictor of
conflict. In this paper, we analyze the ethnicity with a different approach;
primarily we try to estimate the relationship between well-being and the elec-
toral cycle factors —where ethnic identification is more salient— and then the
relationship between well-being and ethnicity.
We test these hypotheses with several well-being questions, provided by the
Afrobarometer across 12 African countries. We find strong and robust evidence
that political competition increases individual-level subjective well-being. The
change in well-being is related to how close in time the survey is to an elec-
tion and this proximity effect depends on the competitiveness of the election.
Subjective well-being increases more in a competitive election period, in which
the margin of victory is near zero compared to a landslide election. For ev-
ery month closer a country is to a competitive election, on an average the
individual-level subjective well-being demonstrates a 0.015 standard deviation
increase. Since ethnic attachments grow stronger with political competition,
we would expect to observe a positive relationship between ethnic attachment
and subjective well-being. This is exactly the pattern: individuals who iden-
tify themselves ethnically have a higher subjective well-being than those who
identify categories such as religion, gender, and class/occupation.
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There are several possible mechanisms that account for these relationships.
The first step in investigating this is to test the effects of winning elections on
individual subjective well-being. Pierce, Rogers, and Snyder (2013) examine
the immediate hedonic impact of electoral loss and victory to well-being. They
conclude that elections strongly affect the well-being of partisan losers (for
about a week), but minimally impact partisan winners. Moreover, Kahneman,
Diener, and Schwarz (1999) suggest that partisan identity has considerable
implications for the growing literature on well-being in economics, psychol-
ogy, and other fields. The results show that winning the national election
increases subjective well-being. A second possibility may be that individual
subjective well-being increases as election day approaches, but then starts to
fall gradually. We find that the proximity —before and after the election— is
positively related to subjective well-being, but the impact before the election is
greater than that after the election. The third one may be focused on whether
there is any link between public expenditure and individual well-being. We
find that the public expenditure on defense increases the individual-level sub-
jective well-being. A fourth possibility may be that having participated in
politics can increase subjective well-being. Stutzer and Frey (2006) show that
in Switzerland engaging directly in the democratic process through referenda
increases life satisfaction. Discussing politics and interested in public affairs
have a positive impact on subjective well-being in SSA. The fifth and last
mechanism that voting in free and fair elections improves the well-being of
the individual. In addition of these mechanisms, ethnic identification might
be seen as a group to which one wishes to belong. At election time politicians
who play the ethnic card strategy might be increasing individual well-being
via group/team effect.5
This paper also documents how individual-level variables are related to sub-
5The scope of this paper is to understand the effects of elections, and is a call for further
research.
119
jective well-being. Overall, being older, employed, having higher education,
living in urban areas, and having higher income have a positive impact on
subjective well-being. Education especially has an enormous influence on the
happiness level of the individual.
The econometric framework employs the same model as that of Eifert et al.
(2010), which tries to capture the effects of proximity, the competitiveness of
national elections, and the interaction of both variables, while controlling for
large sets of individual variables such as gender, age, age-squared, rural/urban
areas, education levels, employment status, and economic conditions. The
Afrobarometer enables employing country fixed effects that control for country-
level features, including unobservable characteristics that can not be measured
since they have been collected not only across multiple countries but also at
multiple points in time for the same countries. This creates a major advantage
in testing the election variables that vary within countries across survey rounds.
The literature on subjective well-being and elections is very limited. So far
there are two methods to analyze the relationship between elections and subjec-
tive well-being. One is to conduct a survey two days before and two days after
elections [Pierce, Rogers, and Snyder (2013)], which is a very difficult dataset
to construct. The other method is to use a panel dataset [Powdthavee, Dolan,
and Metcalfe (2008)]. They test whether subjective well-being affects voting
intentions, and the result of the election affects subjective well-being by using
the British Household Panel Data (BHPS).6 They find evidence that subjec-
tive well-being can affect voting intention but no evidence indicates that the
results of three recent elections have had any effect on subjective well-being in
the United Kingdom. They make use of the general elections in the UK in May
1997, June 2001, and May 2005. The BHPS takes place between September
and December every year. Therefore, the wave before an election is six to nine
6The BHPS provides information on individual, household, and job/employer-related
characteristics from 1991 to 2008 in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
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months, and the wave after the election is roughly three to six months. The
Afrobarometer is a cross-sectional dataset and the easiest way to capture the
impact of elections on the subjective well-being is to create a variable such
as “electoral proximity”. Since it is a cross-section dataset, we cannot follow
the individuals: however, there is something of an indication as to the average
impact every month closer to the election on individual-level subjective well
being.
Competitive elections and ethnic identification produce a higher level of in-
dividual well-being. These results should be taken into consideration when
implementing policies opposed to politically induced ethnic identification. Eth-
nicity can help to develop society, both socially and economically, by mobiliz-
ing people to initiate development projects in their communities. Glennerster
et al. (2013) show that ethnically diverse communities have levels of collective
action that are statistically indistinguishable from homogeneous communities
in post-war Sierra Leone, one of the worlds poorest and most ethnically diverse
countries. Moreover, Habyarimana et al. (2007) explore the impact of ethnic
diversification in a laboratory environment. Their policy oriented conclusion
is that generating higher levels of public good in heterogeneous communities
does not require the segregation of ethnic groups. The challenge is to gen-
erate effective cooperation in diverse societies. Institutions are important for
conducting effective policies to overcome high level of ethnic identification.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the
dataset, justifies the construction of dependent and independent variables,
and explains the details of the econometric model. Section 4.3 presents the
estimates, and discusses in detail the results summarized above. Section 4.4
concludes.
121
4.2 Data and Methodology
4.2.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The paper utilizes the Afrobarometer from Round 1 to Round 4 - the latest
survey round available. The Afrobarometer measures the social, political, and
economic atmosphere in Africa at an individual-level with a cross-sectional
approach. The survey collects detailed information about the respondents’ in-
dividual characteristics, views about democracy, governance, livelihoods, eco-
nomic concerns, social capital, conflict and crime, their participation in the
electoral process, and perceptions about national identities. Each survey em-
ploys the same sampling methodology and includes a large, nationally repre-
sentative sample of individuals.
Twelve Sub-Saharan African countries are used in this study7: Botswana,
Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.8 The survey that we employ spans from
1999 and 2009 covering almost ten years of information from each country.
In order to account for country fixed effects, all countries exist in each sur-
vey round. To achieve national representativeness, appropriate weights and
clustered samplings have been used. Weights are calculated as 1/(number of
observations for that country).
The Afrobarometer includes several candidates for well-being:
1. Your Present Living Conditions - “In general, how would you describe
your own present living conditions?”
2. Your Living Conditions in 12 Months - “Looking ahead, do you expect
the following to be better or worse?: Your living conditions in twelve
7Number of observations in the regressions varies depending on the availability of the
variable in rounds.
8See Table (4.1) for detailed information of countries and survey years.
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months time?”
3. Your Living Conditions Compared to 12 months Ago - “Looking back,
how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago?: Your
living conditions?”
4. Mental Health - “In the last month, how much of the time: Have you been
so worried or anxious that you have felt tired, worn out, or exhausted?”
5. Your Living Conditions Compared to Others - “In general, how do you
rate your living conditions compared to those of other in your country?”
6. Ethnic Group Economic Conditions - “Think about the condition of your
ethnic group. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better
than other groups in this country?”
The first three questions’ responses are based on a five point scale with 1
representing “very bad”, 2 “fairly bad”, 3 “neither good nor bad”, 4 “fairly
good” and 5 “very good”. “Mental health” question is also reported based on
a five point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always). “Your living conditions
compared to others” and “ethnic group economic conditions” are ranked on
a five point scale on which 1 indicates “much worse” and 5 indicates “much
better”.
To streamline the interpretation and draw a general conclusion, we analyze hy-
potheses with three different dependent variables to create indices. We create
summary indices aggregating information across related outcomes of similar
subjective well-being questions [Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007)]. The main
motivation for this grouping is to improve the statistical ability to detect ef-
fects that are consistent across specific outcomes when these specific outcomes
also have idiosyncratic shocks. Following the methodology of Kling, Liebman,
and Katz (2007), we create summary indices based on specific outcomes, in
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which specific outcomes are normalized by subtracting the mean of the group
and then dividing by the standard deviation of the group. Formally, Xi is the
i-th of I outcomes; let µi be the group mean and let σi be the standard devia-





i /I. Overall, the summary index is defined as the weighted
average of z-score of its components. The z-scores are normalized scores based
on the group mean and standard deviation. As stated in the Table (4.1), each
component of the index has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The first outcome is for “your living conditions” which is a combination of the
first three questions. These questions respectively evaluate the individual’s cur-
rent situation, future condition and the comparison of current and past living
conditions, in an attempt to measure well-being in a time perspective. In this
respect, they are from the same domain, which enables aggregate information
across related outcomes. The mean of “your living conditions in 12 months”
is higher than the other two living condition variables, most probably due to
the individual’s high expectations and aspirations for the future. The mean of
comparison of current and past living conditions using “your living conditions
compared to 12 months ago” is higher than the current living conditions, which
might roughly be interpreted as an indication that the people are becoming
happier. The second outcome is the combination of “mental health” with a
mean of 3 and a standard deviation of 0.95. We reversed the signs for mental
health, so that higher values correspond to higher subjective well-being for all
outcomes. “Mental health” question can be evaluated as the General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ) since the GHQ also measures whether a respondent suf-
fers from a health problem related to anxiety or depression. The last outcome
is for “your conditions compared to others”, which is a combination of the last
two questions. This assumes a reference group of language/tribe/ethnic group.
This assumption becomes stronger with the similar mean approximately 2.8.9
9All regressions were also tested separately using the six well-being questions on the
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For the individual characteristics we control for gender, age, age-squared, ru-
ral/urban areas, education levels, employment status, and economic condi-
tions. The variables of economic conditions are the indices of the following
questions, “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your
family gone without enough food to eat, enough clean water for home use,
medicines or medical treatment, and a cash income?”. To test the relationship
between subjective well-being and ethnic identification, we make use of the
personal identification question; “Besides being [a citizen of X], which spe-
cific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?” We group responses
into five categories: language/ethnic group/tribe, religion, occupation/class,
gender, and other. The other category stands for race, region, age, “I’m my
own person”. We adopt country-fixed effect framework, which automatically
controls for many other aspects of country: level of economic development, his-
tory, civil war, etc.10 All regressions include round dummies and are clustered
by countries.
Nearly half of the individuals in the sample are male with an average age of 37.
We restrict the sample minimum age to 18, which means that all individuals
have the right to vote. Approximately 37% of individuals in the sample live in
urban areas. We collapse education into seven categories. Post-graduate refers
to graduate studies with 0.4% of the sample meeting this criterion. Nearly 3%
graduated from a university. The highest share in education falls into primary
and secondary school. Less than half of the sample is unemployed. As a proxy
of income variable we control for economic conditions, which is an index that
averages together income related variables such as how often the respondent
had gone without food, water, medical care, and income. Nearly 35% of in-
dividuals in the dataset identified themselves with the occupation/class, 26%
indicated that they belonged to a language/ethnic/tribe, 16% stated religion
list. The results (not shown) are parallel with the indices results. They are available upon
request.
10Results are robust even if dropping a single country in the dataset.
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and identifying themselves in their gender group identification has the smallest
number of responses at 0.4%.
Table (4.2) summarizes economic and political characteristics of sample coun-
tries. The average GDP per capita of sample countries is higher than the
average of Sub-Saharan Africa, which is mainly driven by Botswana, Namibia,
and South Africa. The other countries are poorer on an average in the SSA.
Rates of urbanization are almost the same level as the SSA average. Utilizing
at least two11 round surveys brings variations in the months to election vari-
able, which is called “proximity to the election” in the regression. In Botswana,
for example, -1 means that the survey round occurred one month before the
election and 15 means the survey round occurred 15 months after the elec-
tion. The competition of presidential election is measured by vote margin,
and is simply the vote share difference between the winner and the runner-up.
The competitiveness level in sample countries is similar to the African aver-
age. Utilizing three rounds of the Afrobarometer brings more variation in the
competitiveness variable since we can make use of more elections. The last
column stands for the name of the ruling party during that election period.
This variable is utilized for examining whether winning a competitive election
changes individual-level subjective well-being.
4.2.2 Empirical Methodology
The econometric model is designed to illuminate the influence of proximity
of election, competitiveness of election, and interaction of these two effects to
subjective well-being. In the model i represents the individual respondent, c is
for country, and t denotes the survey round as attached to individual subjec-
tive well-being SWBict. Within this setup, we can systematically analyze the
extent to which individual-level subjective well-being is related to observable
11It can be three depending on the dependent variable.
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characteristics and a country’s political environment.
SWBict = β0 + β1Xict + β2Cct + β3pct + β4cct + β5(pct ∗ cct) + εict (4.1)
The vector Xict represents individual-level variables
12, Cct for country-level
factors; and εict is individual’s idiosyncratic level. The focus of the paper is
on election variables, pct is a proximity variable that measures months until
the election in the country compared to the survey round. In Table (4.2), neg-
ative numbers indicate the most recent past election. Proximity is coded as
-1*abs(months to/from the most recent election) so that larger numbers imply
increasing proximity. cct is a competitiveness variable and defined as vote mar-
gin, which is the gap between the vote share of the winner and the runner-up
in the most recent election. The competitiveness variable is calculated from
vote margin as -1*(vote margin). Larger numbers indicate increasing compet-
itiveness. pct ∗cct is the interaction variable of proximity and competitiveness.




= β3 + β5cct (4.2)
∂SWBict
∂cct
= β4 + β5pct (4.3)
Since the dependent variable is ordinal rather than cardinal, the ideal way to
carry out analyses is through ordered probit. However, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters (2004) demonstrate that the results from cardinal analysis using OLS
is very similar to those from ordinal analysis. For ease of interpretation, the
12See Table (4.1) for individual-level variables.
127
equation is estimated by using OLS.13
4.3 Results and Discussion
This section documents the empirical results and provides an extensive dis-
cussion of the impact of election variables on subjective well-being and the
possible underlying mechanism of this relationship. We also stress the re-
lationship between personal identification and subjective well-being and the
influence of individual characteristics on subjective well-being. Moreover, we
conduct the same exercise of Eifert et al. (2010) with this dataset to show the
salience of ethnicity when competitive elections are near.
We estimate Equation (4.1) using the Afrobarometer controlled for individual
characteristics, country, and round dummies on different well-being measures.
Note that “marginal effects” are reported, which means that estimates are
readily interpretable in terms of our parameters of interest.
4.3.1 Effects of Proximity to Competitive Elections
This section provides a discussion of electoral cycle variables. All three sub-
jective well-being measures generate almost identical results: the impact of
elections on subjective well-being is positive and significant. This leads us
to reject the first hypothesis. The individual well-being increases by 0.015
standard deviation when competitive elections are approaching.
Figure (4.1) shows the proximity to the closest country election on the x-axis
and the predicted subjective well-being (your living conditions) on the y-axis
by competitiveness of national elections.14 Results are documented in two
13The results of the ordered probit model (not shown) are in line with the OLS model.
After controlling for individual characteristics, country, and time dummies “your living
conditions” increases by 0.0173 standard deviation, “your living conditions compared to
others” by 0.014 standard deviation, “mental health” raises by 0.012 standard deviation
when competitive elections are near. The results are available upon request.
14Since there is a robust result among dependent variables, we conduct this analysis with
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groups; high competitiveness, in which the median of the electoral margin is
less than the sample median of 36 percentage points and less competitiveness
(landslide elections), in which the electoral margin is more than the median
sample. The relationship is clearly evident. Landslide elections —even when
in the proximity of elections— yield a lower subjective well-being compared to
relatively higher competitive elections. Subjective well-being becomes higher
as time nears the elections. In other words, elections have a positive impact
on subjective well-being of individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa but only where
elections are meaningful contests for political power.
Tables (4.3.1), (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) report the tests of the first hypothesis under
three specifications. All specifications include country fixed effects, weigh each
observation by 1/(number of observations from that country) to weigh each
country survey round equally and include standard errors clustered at the
country level.
The first columns in Tables (4.3.1), (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) suggest mixed results. In
the case of “your living conditions” the proximity of the survey to a presidential
election (in months, absolute value) on average decreases the living conditions
of the individual. However, the competitiveness of that election (the margin
of victory) has a positive impact on subjective well-being. “Your living con-
ditions compared to others” has exactly opposite results; the competitiveness
of the election decreases the happiness level, while happiness is increased as
the election draws nearer. When competitive elections are held sooner, the
mental health level of the individual decreases. However, the difference in the
“electoral competitiveness” variable is minimal, especially in “mental health”,
which is present only in two rounds of the survey. Specifically, six out of twelve
countries experience a different election. The dataset allows analysis of “your
living conditions” in three rounds, so in that case the variation becomes higher
only the “your living conditions” variable for the figure.
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when all countries have experienced at least one different election. Given these
concerns, it is wise to pay attention to interaction terms between proximity
and competitiveness. After adding the interaction term to the regression (the
second column of Tables ((4.3.1), (4.3.2) and (4.3.3)), positive and statistically
significant coefficients of election variables among all dependent variables are
obtained. More specifically, every month closer a country gets to a competi-
tive election, on average individual-level subjective well-being increases 0.011-
0.017 in standard deviation depending on the dependent variable of well-being.
Moreover, the higher the competitiveness of the election, the greater the sub-
jective well-being of the individual. The results are confirmed in Column 3,
which controls for individual-level characteristics such as age, gender, educa-
tion, economic conditions, and urban or rural residence. Among all dependent
variables, the results are quite consistent with each other, and they are iden-
tical among the last two specifications.
Our first hypothesis was expected to a fall in the individual well-being due to
the intense environment of competitive elections. However, the results suggest
the opposite. In the following sections, we test what could be the underlying
mechanism of this results. Potentially, there could be three leading reasons:
(a) People would like to be in an union, where they support the same ideology
and fight for it; in our context union might be “ethnic identification”., (b)
People would like to feel happy if they observe their supported party is close
to win the elections., (c) Or simply participating politics in any way might
give a feeling of contributing country’s political and economical affairs.
4.3.2 Effects of Ethnic Identification
Table (4.4) documents the importance of personal identification on well-being.
The regressions account for individual characteristics, country and time dum-
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mies, and election variables.15 As mentioned above, the personal identification
question is derived from the specific question, which is available only in Rounds
1 and 2. Given the availability of the dependent variable, it is possible to run
the regression only for Round 2. We also reject the second hypothesis. Hav-
ing a personal identification as your ethnic group or religion has a positive
and statistically significant impact on subjective well-being of the individual,
controlling for electoral cycle variables. Gender also plays a role in that pur-
pose but this result should be evaluated with caution since a low percentage
of individuals identified themselves with their gender.
Identifying oneself in an ethnic group may be linked to belonging to a group/team,
which in turn increases happiness levels. When we conduct the analysis with-
out electoral cycle variables, the coefficient of ethnic identification is smaller
compared to controlling for electoral cycle variables. This suggests that the
more pronounced the ethnic identification, the higher is the subjective well-
being of the individual. Unlike general expectations about high ethnic diver-
sification creating lower individual well-being, individuals who identify them-
selves as their ethnic group report higher well-being. Social heterogeneity in
Sub-Saharan Africa can make use of this information for policy. It may be
the case that politicians who play the ethnic card strategy in their election
campaign stimulate the well-being of individuals.
When the individual evaluates their living conditions based on a time pref-
erences, which is “your living conditions”, this is negatively related to ethnic
identification. However, the other two dependent variable are in parallel with
each other and positively related. There might be several mechanism behind
this relationship. Several studies are argued that there are cultural differences
between the ethnic groups regarding subjective well-being. Ethnic groups have
different conceptions of well-being and that different factors influence their sub-
15The same regressions have been run without election variables (not shown), which is in
line with the previous one. The results are available upon request.
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jective well-being [Neff (2007), Agyemang et al. (2013)]. For instance, Addai
and Pokimica (2010) report that ethnicity is an important determinant of per-
ceived economic well-being of individuals in Ghana. In their analysis ethnicity
tends to have both negative and positive effect on economic well-being among
different ethnic groups and different sub-sample.
Religion identification yields positive relationship with all dependent variables
and has statistically significant in “your living conditions” and “your living
conditions compared to others”. It is a well-known fact that individuals with
strong religious beliefs report a higher level of life satisfaction and greater
personal happiness [Ellison (1991), Ellison, Boardman, Williams, and Jackson
(2001)]. Religion is also shaped perceived economic well-being of individuals
in Ghana [Pokimica, Addai, and Takyi (2012)].
4.3.3 The Salience of Ethnicity
This subsection conducts the same exercise of Eifert et al. (2010) with our
dataset. The dataset differs from their dataset in terms of sample countries
—Ghana and Lesotho are included— and some individual characteristics such
as the economic conditions. The main motivation is to observe whether the
ethnic identification is more pronounced during competitive elections with our
dataset. We run regressions using a multinomial logit model and ordinary
least square and control for individual characteristics and time and country
dummies. The results in Table (4.5) are in line with Eifert et al. (2010). Every
month closer to competitive elections, survey respondents are on average 1.8
percentage points more likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms.
Since 1990, the banning of ethnic parties has become the norm in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In our dataset the ethnic banning countries are Tanzania and Uganda.
For instance, Tanzania has used the education system and redistribution of re-
132
sources to develop a sense of national as opposed to ethnic identity. The stud-
ies that show the impact of ethnic banning in parties conclude that these laws
have only marginally influenced the character of the political parties [Moroff
(2010)]. Ethnic banning may alter the origin of parties, resulting in ethnic-
free parties. This affects voting behavior and subjective well-being. Ethnic
banning can also influence the salience of ethnic identification. Tanzania has
among the lowest degree of ethnic identity salience in one of the Afrobarometer
survey rounds, at just 3%. Eifert et al. (2010) also show Tanzania’s outlier
status. The presidential election has little impact on the share of the popula-
tion that identifies themselves in ethnic terms. In Figure (4.1), one can also
observe that the impact of the proximity of elections on subjective well-being
is less in Tanzania compared to other countries. Tanzania’s situation is proof
of the strength of ethnic identification in politics.16 Miguel (2004) examines
the success of nation-building policies in Tanzania, which have had a beneficial
long-run impact on country’s political stability and economic development.
4.3.4 Background Mechanisms of Elections and Subjec-
tive Well-Being
It has been clearly documented that elections make people happier. This
finding requires more research to understand the underlying mechanism of
the positive relationship. There might be several channels but the most pro-
nounced ones are winning elections, ex-ante and ex-post impact of elections,
the effects of public expenditure such as education, health, and defense, the
effects of having actively participated in politics, and trust in the national elec-
toral commission. This part of the paper explains these leading background
relationships.
16However, subtracting these countries in the regression of ethnic salience and the impact
of elections to the subjective well-being does not alter the results. We cannot conduct
analyses based in Tanzania and Uganda due to high collinearity of election variables.
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Effects of Winning Elections. The model is tested to determine whether win-
ning the election has an influence on subjective well-being. The dummy vari-
able is created for that purpose utilizing the following question “Do you feel
close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which
party or organization is that?” Since the winning party of this election is
known, if the winning party is the same as the answer from the individual, it
is scored as a one; otherwise it is scored as zero. Using the same model the
results show that winning the competitive election increases individual-level
subjective well-being. “Your living conditions” and “your living conditions
compared to others” yield positive and statistically significant results. Win-
ning the election is positively related with “Mental health” dependent variable
but it is not statistically significant.
Individuals might think that winning the election is an economic privilege, em-
ployment opportunities, protection from possible threats in the future such as
civil war, ethnic clashes etc., and easy access to health and education services.
These opportunities increase the expectations and aspirations of individuals
and lead to higher individual well-being. The joy of wining also increases
well-being. Moreover, almost all countries in the dataset except for Malawi
and Mali have had the same incumbent for at least three presidential elec-
tions. Winners might have perceived retaining the presidency as maintaining
the status quo of ongoing policies, thereby raising happiness.
Asymmetrical Effects of Elections. Individual’s expectations and aspirations
may be higher before rather than after the election and these may form one’s
level of happiness. There is a strong possibility that subjective well-being
increases as election day approaches but then starts to fall post-election. The
model is designed for testing the symmetric effects of elections. In order to
observe asymmetrical effects especially before the election, we create a dummy
variable for countries in which round surveys would be completed prior to the
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nearest election. If the election to month variable is above (below) zero, it is
referred to as “after (before) election” and carries a value of 1. The ex-ante
and ex-post effects have a positive and statistically significant relationship
with individual well-being.17 The impact of the electoral cycle on subjective
well-being is more powerful before the election than after the election.
During election campaigns the general tendency is to conduct populist policies
such as expansionary fiscal policies —cut taxes, increase government spending,
and subsidize small and medium sized enterprises— by the incumbent, provid-
ing food, water or other necessities that the people need, and gifts to entertain
society. Block (2002) analyzes a number of fiscal and monetary variables in
Sub-Saharan Africa during and after elections and concludes that governmen-
tal spending shifts toward more visible, current expenditures and away from
public investment. This temporary help may increase individual well-being. In
addition, individuals want to believe that something will change within their
country with the coming of the election; this hope may yield a higher sub-
jective well-being. The leading reason for observing positive well-being after
an election may be due to a decrease in the intensity of the environment. In-
dividuals can attain relief since the uncertainty deriving from the election is
over.
Effects of Public Expenditure. There might be a potential link between pub-
lic expenditure and voter’s well-being. The individual may be happy during
the period of the incumbent party due to an increase in public welfare. As
mentioned in the previous paragraph, governments may try to influence their
popularity around elections by increasing public expenditures. Thereby, we
analyze whether a change in public expenditure on education, health, and de-
fense can have an impact on the well-being of individual. We focus on change
in public expenditures by sections such as education, health, and defense in-
17See Table (4.6.1) Only ex-ante effects of the electoral cycle are represented. The result
of ex-post effects is available upon request.
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stead of total change in public expenditure because politicians may change
the composition of expenditure in an election year, without increasing the
overall budget. We control for the change in public expenditure during the
election year; when the election was held in Botswana in 1999, we account for
the change in public expenditure from 1998 to 1999. We utilize the change in
“government expenditure on education” for education and “government expen-
diture on health” for health, and defense is based on “government expenditure
on military”18.
Among three types of public expenditure, the impact of defense expenditure on
individual well-being is the highest and statistically significant for satisfaction
with your living conditions and satisfaction with your living conditions com-
pared to others. The military spending is an important issue for SSA, which
has been through considerable turmoil, with high levels of conflict in the re-
gion and within country, that especially increases during the election period.
Individuals may feel secure when the government expenditure is higher on
the military and this feeling of security may lead to increase their well-being.
The relationship between health expenditure and individual well-being is only
positive and statistically significant in satisfaction with your living conditions.
Regarding education expenses, it is positively related with well-being however,
is not statistically significant.
Effects of Participating in Politics. The Afrobarometer permits analyzing this
mechanism in various ways. The main way is to look into whether discussing
politics19 and being interested in public affairs20 increase individual well-being.
18Data is taken from World Development Indicators.
19The exact wording of discuss politics is “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes
take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of
these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Discussed
politics with friends or neighbors?”. It is a three point based scale, 0 refers to “No, would
never do this” and 2 is “Yes, frequently”. It is available only in Round 3 and 4.
20The formal question of interested in public affairs is “How interested are you in public
affairs?”. It is a four point based scale, 0 refers to “Not interested” and 3 refers to “Very
interested”. It is available in all rounds.
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The mean of discussing politics is 0.91 and a standard deviation of 0.72. The
mean of interested in public affairs is 1.78 and a standard deviation of 1.10.
In line with each other, they are positively related with individual subjective
well-being.21 Thirdly, we check the impact of active participation such as
attending a demonstration or protest march. The last and the fourth way
may be that the interaction with political party official increases well-being of
the individual. The individual can feel important if he/she discusses topics
related with country someone in power. Both have no significant impact on
any dependent variable. However, number of responses to the questions are
low; more than fifty percent of the sample never attend a demonstration, and
less than ten percent of the sample get in contact with a political party official.
Individuals in low-income countries participating in politics, after the passage
of an election may feel particularly valuable. These individuals make a fun-
damental contribution to democratic governance in their country, which can
change the future of the country. Moreover, when the electoral process is com-
petitive and candidates or parties are forced to expose their records and future
intentions to popular scrutiny, more discussion and interest in politics arises.
Doing something valuable for one’s country may produce a higher subjective
well-being.
Effects of Illegitimacy of Elections. To gain a sense of the illegitimacy of elec-
tions, we control for “trust national electoral commission”, which has a mean
of 1.56 and a standard deviation of 1.1. The trust variable is positively and
significantly correlated with subjective-well being. The higher the legitimacy
in elections, the higher is the subjective well-being of the individual. Allowing
people to freely choose from different alternatives in competitive elections in-
creases political trust and those increases lead to greater subjective well-being.
21These variables are tested separately. Only the result of “interested in public affairs” is
presented.
137
In Sub-Saharan Africa, vote buying and ballot fraud are serious problems
during elections. In the Afrobarometer, the only variable to control for that
purpose is “trust national electoral commission”. However, this variable should
be evaluated carefully since conditional correlations exist. An individual who
thinks that elections are free and fair probably the one who wins the election:
s/he already feels content about the election result. On the other hand, the
loser starts blaming the commission since s/he is not happy with the result.
4.3.5 Effects of Individual-level Variables on Subjective
Well-Being
Table (4.7) shows the relationship between individual-level subjective well-
being and individual characteristics. Unlike findings in Western societies, being
female is negatively correlated with mental health of the individual; however,
females fare better when compared with other ethnic groups. Women in SSA
are facing human rights abuses such as sexual discrimination and abuse, inti-
mate violence, political marginalization, and economic deprivation. These may
lead to have lower well-being. Older people are happier, which is in line with
Western societies. Living in rural areas has a negative impact on well-being
of individuals, and the coefficient becomes higher especially when respondents
compare themselves to others. In SSA, those living in rural areas experience
more poverty and less access to health care and education. Sahn and Stifel
(2003) conduct a study in 24 African countries and conclude that standards
of living in rural areas almost universally lag behind in urban areas.22 Ed-
ucation has a huge, positive and significant impact on subjective well-being
of the individual. It is a well-known fact that in Western societies highly ed-
ucated individuals are less happy than high school, secondary, and primary
school graduates, mostly because of higher expectations and aspirations from
22Education, school enrollments and the ratio of girl-to-boy enrollments is much lower in
rural areas than in urban areas.
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life, especially jobwise. However, in the case of SSA, education improves the
well-being of individuals. There is room to gain from policies for education to
increase the well-being of individuals. Not surprisingly, being employed is pos-
itively related to all dependent variables of well-being. If a person experiences
economic difficulties, this decreases the happiness level of the individual and
the coefficient is higher when they compare themselves to their ethnic group.
It is clearly observed that an income-comparison23 argument is also valid in
that region.
4.4 Concluding Remarks and Discussion
As Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) stated, the source of ethnic salience
comes from political competition: in other words, proximity to competitive
elections increases the strength of ethnic attachments. A general consensus ex-
ists about the negative relationship between economic development and social
heterogeneity based on both cross-country regressions and individual country
studies. This paper brings a different angle to the discussion of election, ethnic
identification, and growth. It explores these phenomena under the umbrella
of well-being by asking: “How do competitive elections affect individual-level
subjective well-being?”, and “Is there any relationship between ethnic iden-
tification and subjective well-being?” The results show that for every month
closer a country is to a competitive election, on average individual-level sub-
jective well-being has a 0.015 standard deviation increase. Moreover, if indi-
viduals identify themselves ethnically higher, this is positively correlated with
individual-level subjective well-being. These findings are important for design-
ing policies to increase social welfare in SSA.
These findings point to the background mechanism of this question: “Why do
elections make people happier given that competitive elections in this region
23Income is evaluated relative to others (social comparison).
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have a very intense environment?” We look into five possible mechanisms:
winning the election, the effects of forthcoming election, the impact of public
expenditure on education, health, and defense, the environment of free and
fair elections, and participation in politics. These mechanisms have a positive
impact on the well-being of individuals. The policy maker should internalize
this positive externality of election and ethnic identification on individual-level
well being. As stated in Habyarimana et al. (2007), enforcing cooperation
among individuals, in this context the same ethnic group, would make policies
more effective. Our results also suggest that individuals feel happier when
they are identified themselves ethnically. Thereby, combination of these results
might enable us to draw a conclusion such that policies may be implemented
in an ethnic group-level rather than a country-level.
The findings of the paper should be treated very cautiously regarding policy
implications. These positive well-being effects occur only when elections are
proximate. In the short run, these positive externalities might boost economic
growth, but the long-run implications are ambiguous. Moreover, there might
be some events during competitive elections which could possibly alter the
subjective well-being and these may create some bias in the results.
Apart from the empirical findings this paper has three good features for ana-
lyzing hypotheses. It creates indices of well-being questions to aggregate same
outcomes across domains such as time and comparison. We have grouped
three well-being questions that evaluate living conditions regarding time and
two well-being questions based on comparisons of respondents’ lives. A second
methodological contribution is to make use of repeated country-level observa-
tions with micro-individual survey data. Since the data have been collected at
multiple points in time for the same countries, it allows for variation in key pa-
rameters of interest such as the proximity of the survey to the nearest election
and the competitiveness of that contest. Moreover, well-being of individuals is
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affected mostly by the characteristics of the social and political environment
in which he or she lives. Using the feature of data, we employ a country fixed
effect model to overcome country-level characteristics. Thirdly, these results
are drawn from cross-national survey data rather than case studies and anec-
dotal evidence, which allows for generalized cross settings and creates a much
stronger position.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics-Afrobarometer, Round 1-2-3-4
Variable Mean Std.Dev Available
Round
Dependent Variable
1-Your Living Conditions 0 1 2-3-4
Your Present Living Conditions 2.61 1.22 2-3-4
Nor. Your Present Living Conditions 0 1 2-3-4
Your Living Conditions in 12 Months 3.39 1.25 1-2-3-4
Nor. Your Living Conditions in 12 Months 0 1 2-3-4
Your Living Conditions Compared to 12 Months Ago 3.01 1.131 1-2-3-4
Nor. Your Living Conditions Compared to 12 Months
Ago
0 1 2-3-4
2- Nor. Mental Health 0 1 2-3
Mental Health 3.05 0.95 2-3
3-Your Conditions Compared to Others 0 1 3-4
Your Living Conditions Compared to Others 2.81 1.08 1-2-3-4
Nor. Your Living Conditions Compared to Others 0. 1 3-4
Ethnic Group Economic Conditions to Others 2.8 1.017 3-4
Nor. Ethnic Group Economic Conditions to Others 0 1 3-4
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.50 0.5 1-2-3-4
Age 36.79 14.89 1-2-3-4
Urban 0.37 0.48 1-2-3-4
Post-Graduate 0.004 0.06 1-2-3-4
University 0.03 0.16 1-2-3-4
High School 0.07 0.25 1-2-3-4
Secondary School 0.37 0.48 1-2-3-4
Primary School 0.36 0.48 1-2-3-4
Informal Schooling 0.03 0.18 1-2-3-4
No schooling 0.13 0.34 1-2-3-4
Employed 0.37 0.48 1-2-3-4
Interested in public affairs 1,78 1,10 2-3-4
Trust national electoral commission 1.56 1.1 2-3-4
Economic Conditions 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without food 3.02 1.07 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without food 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without water 3.08 1.11 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without water 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without medical care 2.95 1.1 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without medical care 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without cash income 2.58 1.17 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without cash income 0 1 2-3-4
Personal Identification
Occupation/Class 0.35 0.47 1-2
Language/Ethnic/Tribe Group 0.26 0.44 1-2
Religion 0.16 0.36 1-2
Gender 0.04 0.20 1-2
Other 0.17 0.38 1-2
# of observations 60,050
Notes: Weights are calculated as 1/(number of observations of that country).
Stated number of observation is for independent variables in all rounds.
Number of observation for each dependent variable is noted in estimation
results.
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Table 4.2: Economic and Political Characteristics of Countries








Botswana,1999 7,727 52 -1 0.31 BDP
Botswana,2003 9,366 56 15 0.25 BDP
Botswana,2005 11,177 57 -8 0.25 BDP
Botswana,2008 14,104 60 12 0.31 BDP
Ghana,1999 1,390 43 12 0.04 NPP
Ghana,2002 1,560 45 22 0.08 NPP
Ghana,2005 2,030 57 -8 0.08 NPP
Ghana,2008 2,486 50 4 0 NDC
Lesotho,2000 1,019 19 -23 0.36 LCD
Lesotho,2003 1,172 22 -10 0.32 LCD
Lesotho,2005 1,330 23 19 0.28 NIP
Lesotho,2008 1,648 25 -20 0.28 NIP
Malawi,1999 556 14 -6 0.14 UDF
Malawi,2003 561 15 12 0.08 Coalition
Malawi,2005 605 15 -13 0.08 Coalition
Malawi,2008 727 15 6 0.36 DPP
Mali,2001 727 29 16 0.92 ADEMA
Mali,2002 747 29 -6 0.3 Coalition
Mali,2005 914 31 22 0.52 ADP
Mali,2008 998 33 -20 0.52 ADP
Namibia,1999 3,872 32 3 0.66 SWAPO
Namibia,2003 4,405 34 14 0.69 SWAPO
Namibia,2006 5,998 36 -15 0.69 SWAPO
Namibia,2008 6,596 37 13 0.64 SWAPO
Nigeria,2000 1,131 42 -10 0.26 Coalition
Nigeria,2003 1,597 44 -6 0.3 PDP
Nigeria,2005 1,795 46 18 0.51 PDP
Nigeria,2008 2,149 48 -13 0.51 PDP
S.Africa,2000 6,653 57 -13 0.57 ANC
S.Africa,2002 7,195 58 19 0.57 ANC
S.Africa,2006 9,319 60 -22 0.57 ANC
S.Africa,2008 10,250 61 6 0.49 ANC
Tanzania,2001 823 23 -7 0.53 CCM
Tanzania,2003 938 23 29 0.69 CCM
Tanzania,2005 1,073 24 4 0.69 CCM
Tanzania,2008 1,313 25 28 0.36 CCM
Uganda,2000 763 12 10 0.42 YKM
Uganda,2002 866 13 -17 0.42 NRM
Uganda,2005 1,014 13 10 0.22 NRM
Uganda,2008 1,268 14 30 0.42 NRM
Zambia,1999 899 35 26 0.04 MMD
Zambia,2003 1,055 36 -17 0.04 MMD
Zambia,2005 1,073 37 13 0.14 Coalition
Zambia,2009 1,367 38 -8 0.02 MMD
Zimbabwe,1999 885 33 7 0.02 ZANU-PF
Zimbabwe,2004 314 35 -26 0.14 ZANU-PF
Zimbabwe,2005 477 36 1 0.53 ZANU-PF
Zimbabwe,2009 425 38 -14 0.05 MDC
Avr, sample 2,840 35 14 0.35 *
Avr, SSA 1,606 37 * 0.34 *
Notes: Macroeconomic variables are taken from World Development
Indicators. Political variables come from African Election Database.
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Table 4.3.1: Your Living Conditions and Electoral Cycle
Dependent Variable: Your Living Conditions
Electoral Proximity -0.0048*** 0.0173*** 0.0172***
(0.0007) (0.0031) (0.003)
Electoral Competitiveness 0.833*** 1.64*** 1.61***
(0.0545) (0.123) (0.12)
Proximity*Competitiveness - 0.0288*** 0.027***
- (0.004) (0.0038)
Individual Characteristics No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R2 0.1064 0.1078 0.1800
N 41,186 41,186 41,186
Notes: Marginal effects dP(Y)/d(X). *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% signifi-
cance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported
in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for individual characteristics, country dum-
mies, and round dummies. Weights are 1/(number of observations of that country).
Competitiveness variable is calculated from vote margin like -1*(Vote Margin). Larger
numbers indicate increasing competitiveness. Proximity is -1*abs(months to/from
nearest election), so that larger numbers imply increasing proximity.
Table 4.3.2: Your Living Conditions Compared to Others and Electoral
Cycle
Dependent Variable: Your Living Conditions Compared to Others
Electoral Proximity 0.0068*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.0009) (0.0093) (0.0009)
Electoral Competitiveness - 0.721*** 0.378*** 0.357***
(0.08) (0.029) (0.0276)
Proximity*Competitiveness - 0.0178*** 0.017***
- (0.0011) (0.0011)
Individual Characteristics No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R2 0.0677 0.0766 0.1763
N 28,844 28,844 28,844
Notes: Marginal effects dP(Y)/d(X). *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country level,
are reported in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for individual character-
istics, country dummies, and round dummies. Weights are 1/(number of obser-
vations of that country). Competitiveness variable is calculated from vote mar-
gin like -1*(Vote Margin). Larger numbers indicate increasing competitiveness.
Proximity is -1*abs(months to/from nearest election), so that larger numbers
imply increasing proximity.
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Table 4.3.3: Mental Health and Electoral Cycle
Dependent Variable: Mental Health
Electoral Proximity -0.0017* 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.0009) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Electoral Competitiveness -0.234*** 0.212 0.365***
(0.0812) (0.159) (0.154)
Proximity*Competitiveness - 0.014*** 0.018***
- (0.004) (0.0044)
Individual Characteristics No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R2 0.0492 0.0495 0.1149
N 31,062 31,062 31,062
Notes: Marginal effects dP(Y)/d(X). *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%,
and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at
the country level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions are con-
trolled for individual characteristics, country dummies, and round dum-
mies. Weights are 1/(number of observations of that country). Com-
petitiveness variable is calculated from vote margin like -1*(Vote Mar-
gin). Larger numbers indicate increasing competitiveness. Proximity is
-1*abs(months to/from nearest election), so that larger numbers imply
increasing proximity.
Table 4.4: Personal Identification and Subjective Well-Being
Dependent Your Living Your Living Condition Mental
Variable Conditions Compared to Others Health
Language/Ethnic/Tribe Group -0.043** 0.043** 0.108***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022)
Religion 0.07*** 0.149*** 0.007
(0.019) (0.0209) (0.025)
Gender -0.038 0.104*** 0.095***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.035)
Other 0.015 0.016 0.058**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024)
N 20,123 17,554 14,484
Adj.R2 0.1496 0.1178 0.1537
Notes: Occupation/Class is taken as a reference point. Regressions are controlled
for individual characteristics, country dummies, and election variables. *, **, ***
indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors,
clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses. Weights are 1/(number
of observations of that country).
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Table 4.5: The Salience of Ethnic Identification
Language/Tribe/Ethnic Group OLS Logit
Electoral Proximity 0.012*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.14)






Notes: Marginal effects dP(Y)/d(X). *, **, *** indicate
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are re-
ported in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for
individual characteristics, country dummies and round
dummies. Weights are 1/(number of observations of
that country).
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Table 4.6.1: Before the election
Dependent Your Living Your Living Condition Mental
Variable Conditions Compared to Others Health
Before Election 1.58*** 1.44*** 1.40***
(0.105) (0.248) (0.172)
Before Election*Electoral Proximity 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.038***
(0.003) (0.0097) (0.0057)
Before Election*Electoral Competitiveness 1.78*** 1.26*** 1.37***
(0.095) (0.0207) (0.143)
Before Election*Proximity*Competitiveness 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.037***
(0.0043) (0.012) (0.0058)
N 41,186 28,844 31,062
Adj.R2 0.1879 0.1723 0.0994
Notes: Marginal effects dP(Y)/d(X). *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors,
clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for individual characteristics, country dummies,
and round dummies. Weights are 1/(number of observations of that country). Competitiveness variable is calculated from vote margin
like -1*(Vote Margin). Larger numbers indicate increasing competitiveness. Proximity is -1*abs(months to/from nearest election), so
that larger numbers imply increasing proximity. Before the election is 1 if round survey would be before the nearest election.
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Table 4.6.2: Public Expenditures
Dependent Your Living Your Condition Mental
Variable Conditions Compared to Others Health
PE on Education 0.0758 0.0581 0.0321
(0.230) (0.135) (0.0784)
PE on Health 0.0648* 0.00692 0.00336
(0.00337) (0.216) (0.0744)
PE on Defense 0.0322** 0.0179*** 0.0369
(0.0158) (0.00885) (0.181)
N 41,186 28,844 31,062
Adj.R2 0.1821 0.1780 0.1158
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels,
respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are re-
ported in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for individual char-
acteristics, country dummies, round dummies, and election variables.
Weights are 1/(number of observations of that country).
Table 4.6.3: Winning the election
Dependent Your Living Your Condition Mental
Variable Conditions Compared to Others Health
Winning Dummy 0.0401*** 0.030** 0.0010
(0.0108) (0.0126) (0.013)
N 41,186 28,844 31,062
Adj.R2 0.1821 0.1780 0.1158
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels,
respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are re-
ported in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for individual char-
acteristics, country dummies, round dummies, and election variables.
Weights are 1/(number of observations of that country).
149
Table 4.6.4: Interested in Public Affairs
Dependent Your Living Your Condition Mental
Variable Conditions Compared to Others Health
Interested in public affairs 0.0285*** 0.0280*** 0.015***
(0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0079)
N 41,186 28,844 31,062
Adj.R2 0.1813 0.1765 0.1160
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses. Re-
gressions are controlled for individual characteristics, country dummies, round
dummies, and election variables. Weights are 1/(number of observations of that
country).
Table 4.6.5: Illegitimacy of Elections
Dependent Your Living Your Condition Mental
Variable Conditions Compared to Others Health
Trust National Electoral Commission 0.0410*** 0.0252*** -0.0057
(0.00474) (0.00542) (0.00592)
N 41,186 28,844 31,062
Adj.R2 0.1799 0.1760 0.1153
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard
errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions are controlled
for individual characteristics, country dummies, round dummies, and election variables.
Weights are 1/(number of observations of that country).
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Table 4.7: Estimates for Individual-level Coefficients
Your Living Your Conditions Mental
Conditions Compared to Others Health
Female -0.00660 0.0198* - 0.111***
(0.00963) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Age -0.0198*** -0.00720*** 0.00183
(0.00175) (0.00197) (0.00215)
Age2 0.0170*** 0.00734*** - 0.0165***
(0.00198) (0.00219) (0.00247)
Rural -0.0257** -0.0776*** -0.0225*
(0.0107) (0.0126) (0.0136)
Informal Schooling 0.0524* 0.143*** -0.0275
(0.0276) (0.0320) (0.0387)
Primary School 0.0778*** 0.116*** 0.0647***
(0.0173) (0.0197) (0.0219)
Secondary School 0.170*** 0.242*** 0.161***
(0.0184) (0.0213) (0.0229)
High School 0.310*** 0.355*** 0.294***
(0.0235) (0.0273) (0.0287)
University 0.400*** 0.381*** 0.291***
(0.0283) (0.0336) (0.0347)
Post-Graduate 0.492*** 0.477*** 0.228***
(0.0672) (0.0903) (0.0704)
Employed 0.0694*** 0.0811*** 0.0289**
(0.0109) (0.0130) (0.0128)
Economic Conditions -0.217*** -0.267*** - 0.115***
(0.00537) (0.00633) (0.00648)
N 41,186 28,844 31,062
Adj.R2 0.1800 0.1763 0.1158
Notes: *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, re-
spectively. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported
in parentheses. Regressions are controlled for individual characteristics,
country dummies, round dummies, and election variables. Weights are
1/(number of observations of that country).
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